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Since the beginning of its reign of terror in Iraq, the Islamic State has been targeting 
Shias and encouraging sectarian violence between Shias and Sunnis, based on past 
memories of violence and the instrumentalization of the Battle of Karbala, which is an 
ancient conflict that has become a part of Shia identity and ethos. This thesis analyses the 
dynamics of Shia persecution in Iraq during the regimes of Saddam Hussein and the 
Islamic State, and shows that history has been present at the heart of this national 
conflict. It argues that addressing the historical roots of violence, which can be found in 
the Battle of Karbala, through the mechanisms of transitional justice might be a way of 
encouraging reconciliation between Iraqi Shias and Sunnis, and help guarantee durable 
peace and nonoccurrence of violent outbreaks in the country. This paper provides an 
analysis of the pertinent transitional justice theories and mechanisms, which include 
historical commissions and memorialization, and applies the theoretical framework to the 
case of Karbala by offering tentative suggestions regarding the workings of the process in 
































“ I will not conclude without commending the brave lions of creed, the soldiers of the 
Caliphate, those in Baghdad, in its north and south, who are holding onto hot coals, who 
are firmer than stone, those who humiliate the Rafidah {Shias} in their strongholds and 
their major fortresses every day. How good you are! (…) Your next engagement, by 
Allah’s permission, will be (…) Karbala.” 1 
 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State, 2015  
 
 On May 14, 2015, Islamic State 2 leader and self-proclaimed caliph Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi uttered the words above in an audio speech in which he encouraged all 
Muslims to wage war against all atheists and enemies of Islam, including the Shia 
Muslim population. In fact, he commended his disciples’ assaults on the Shias, and 
congratulated those who made them “swallow cups of humiliation and bitterness.” 3 His 
speech, being a general call to arms, also stood as a call to oppression and persecution of 
the Shia majority in Iraq, especially in the city of Karbala, where the population had 
already faced an oppressive massacre and human rights violations during a historical 
battle in 680AD. By mentioning the event of Karbala, al-Baghdadi, as the perpetrator, not 
only recalled that the Shias have already been victims of human rights atrocities in the 
past, but also that the latter have never been recognized and condemned. Mentioning 
Karbala in this context, and explicitly ordering a reproduction of history, inevitably 
awakens strong memories of injustice and violence within the Shia population, and shows 
that the event still retains importance for both the perpetrators and the victims.  
 The tales of Shia repression, from the early years of Islam to Saddam Hussein’s 
regime and the rule of the Islamic State, can be traced back 1400 years to the historical 																																																								
1 This citation is taken from the English translation of Al-Baghdadi’s speech, which was released by the Islamic State’s 
media company al-Furqan on May 14, 2015. The group itself provided the translation of the audio speech, originally 
2 For practical purposes, the appellation “Islamic State” will be used throughout this thesis to refer to the terrorist 
organization. The use of this term does not legitimize the purpose or actions of the group in any way.    
3 Al-Baghdadi, Abu Bakr. "March Forth Whether Light or Heavy." May 14, 2015.  
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Battle of Karbala, an event that has become an integral part of the Shias’ identity and a 
tool of resistance and empowerment against their oppression today. While the battle is an 
accepted historical event by both Shias and Sunnis, it is not commemorated in similar 
ways or given the same significance and thus becomes a source of dissent. To the Shias, 
Karbala is regarded as the greatest tragedy in the history of humanity during which 
Hussain, the Prophet’s grandson and third Shia Imam, son of ‘Ali, leader of the Shias 
Muslims and first Imam and caliph, was martyred by the army of Umayyad caliph Yazid 
I after the former led a revolutionary movement against the latter’s tyrannical 
government. Over the centuries, Hussain’s martyrdom has been the most passionately 
commemorated event in the Shia world due to the former’s importance as the Prophet’s 
descendant, and plunges the entire community into mourning during the months of 
Muharram and Safar in the Islamic calendar. Through diverse types of rituals, including 
processions and theatrical representations of the event, called ta’ziyeh, believers clad in 
black remember Hussain’s murder, and deplore the injustices that were committed on 
him and his family. On the other hand, while the Sunnis also condemn the event of 
Karbala and hold Imam Hussain in high esteem, they do not publicly commemorate his 
death and find that the mourning process is exaggerated. Instead of commemorating 
Ashura on the tenth of Muharram, most Sunnis fast in remembrance of Moses and live 
the day in joy and gratitude as they celebrate the freedom of the sons of Israel from 
Pharaoh, their enemy in Egypt. Tensions between the groups around the event are further 
exacerbated by Shia accounts of the battle recalling the fact that when Hussain’s severed 
head arrived in Damascus, the Umayyad and their people celebrated and declared a 
national holiday on that day. Hussain’s women and children, made captives, were left 
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standing near the gates for three days, while the people of Damascus decorated the city. 
About fifty thousand men and women, wearing bright colorful clothes, left their houses 
and danced in the streets to the sound of tambourines and flutes, a behavior that contrasts 
greatly with the Shia rituals of mourning on the same day, for the same event. The most 
controversial events in Islamic history, such as the succession of the Prophet and the 
Battle of Karbala, have led to a schism between the two denominations of Islam, and 
have made the construction of a shared historical narrative, in which the idea of 
victimhood would be uncontested, quite difficult to achieve. Along with the dissenting 
opinions about Karbala, the beginning of the Shia-Sunni division, also referred to as the 
Great Schism, must first be discussed in order to understand the fundamental differences 
between the sects, and their role in modern conflicts and atrocities later discussed.           
 Shia Islam formally started at the time of Prophet Muhammad’s death in 632, 
when difference of opinion regarding the succession of the latter as the new leader of the 
Ummah, or Islamic community, divided the Muslim world. The Sunnis are therefore 
recognized as the followers of the three elected Rashidun caliphs, Abu Bakr as-Siddiq, 
‘Umar ibn Khattab and Uthman ibn Affan, while the Shias are supporters of Ali ibn Abi 
Talib, the Prophet’s son-in-law and the first Imam, who they believe was designated as 
successor by the Prophet himself right before his death during the event of Ghadir 
Khumm. It is reported in both traditions that during this episode, the Prophet made a 
statement in which he said that whoever regarded the Prophet as his master (mawla) 
should also regard ‘Ali as his master.  
 While the episode of Ghadir Khumm is narrated in both Shia and Sunni traditions, 
subtleties in the meaning of certain words and different interpretations of the Prophet’s 
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announcements regarding the prominence of ‘Ali and his family have led to dissenting 
opinions among Shias and Sunnis regarding the nomination of the latter as successor. 
Narrations from both denominations recognize that the Prophet made several statements 
in which it was quite clear that ‘Ali was his rightful successor. In one tradition, the 
Prophet is reported to have told ‘Ali, “Are you not content to be with respect to me as 
Aaron was to Moses?” 4 implying that ‘Ali would be his representative after him, just as 
Aaron had been to Moses. Sunni traditions do not dispute that such statements were made 
or that the event of Ghadir, among others, occurred but point to the fact that great honors 
and equal praise were given to Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, and Uthman, who were close 
companions of the Prophet. Historical accounts narrate that right after the death of the 
Prophet in Medina, while ‘Ali and his wife Fatimah were occupied with the funeral, 
powerful Arab clans reunited in a place called Saqifa and elected Abu Bakr as the next 
ruler of the Islamic nation. ‘Ali, refusing to divide the Prophet’s Ummah and create 
greater factions, did not claim his right to the caliphate right away and retracted himself 
from the political scene, only rarely participating when summoned by the first three 
Rashidun caliphs. In 656, ‘Ali ultimately ascended to the position of caliph by popular 
acclamation and became the fourth Rashidun.   
 Believing that the succession of the Prophet was decided hastily and by political 
maneuvering rather than religious consideration and justice, the Shias have constantly 
opposed the established political order and recognize themselves as the party of ‘Ali and 
the supporters of truth against injustice. While Sunnis recall the first three caliphs as 
“epitomes of Islamic piety and paragons of wise rule,” 5 the Shias view them as usurpers 
																																																								
4 Momen, Moojan. Shi’i Islam. London: Oneworld Publications, 2016. 
5 Ibid.  
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of ‘Ali’s rightful position. Ever since, the Shia branch is recognized through the 
coalescence of two main trends. In the political realm, they are the “underdogs, the 
downtrodden trying to assert themselves against the powerful elite of the Islamic 
Empire,” 6 and in the religious one, a political process movement that is centered on the 
Prophet and his family’s suffering and martyrdom. The massacre of Hussain at Karbala 
by the powerful Umayyad government, and the mistreatment of his women and children 
in the aftermath of the battle consolidated the Great Schism, and marked the peak of Shia 
oppression in Islamic history. While ‘Ali’s claim to leadership was understood by many, 
it is Hussain’s martyrdom that affected the hearts and added a powerful religious 
dimension to the movement of political opposition that characterizes the Shia branch. The 
Battle of Karbala has become a core component of Shia collective memory, a concept 
that John Gillis defines as a representation of the past that “fosters and defines group 
identities, telling a group of people where they have come from, who they are and how 
they should act in the present and the future.” 7 Alexandra Barahona de Brito adds in a 
reinforcing claim that “people do not act only according to strategic calculations, but in 
the light of the memories and narratives they have adopted and that make sense to them 
as members of a particular memory group.” 8 Kamran Scot Aghaie has established in his 
work that the event of Karbala transcends the barriers of time and space for the Shias 9, 
given the strong affection and religious ties that they share with their infallible Imams. 
																																																								
6 Ibid. 
7 Gillis, John R. Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1994. Gillis is 
Professor Emeritus of History at Rutgers University.  
8 Barahona de Brito, Alexandra. “Transitional Justice and Memory: Exploring Perspectives,” South European Society 
and Politics 15 (3): 359-371. Barahona de Brito is a researcher and editorial advisor. She has made various 
contributions to the fields of transitional justice, human rights and European-Latin American relations.  
9 Aghaie, Kamran Scot. The Martyrs of Karbala: Shi'i Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran. Seattle: U of Washington, 
2004. Aghaie is a professor of Islamic history at the University of Texas at Austin.  
	 9	
While the Shia population is diverse, it is united through the remembrance of Karbala and 
a strong memory of discrimination, both in politics and fundamental rights.     
 It would not be an exaggeration to say that history is often at the heart of national 
conflicts today, and al-Baghdadi’s aforementioned statement is a proof of this claim. 
Lesley Hazleton writes that “the Karbala story is indeed one without end, still unfolding 
through the Muslim world, and most bloodily of all in Iraq, the cradle of Shia Islam.” 10 
Indeed, it can be argued that the atrocities perpetrated in Karbala against Hussain and his 
people, who were all of course Shia, are recurrent and similar to the human rights 
violations that the Islamic State is inflicting on Iraq’s majority nowadays. The 
aforementioned quote by al-Baghdadi makes a direct reference to the event of Karbala, 
and encourages his army to recreate the scene against Shias in contemporary Karbala. In 
fact, several parallels can be drawn between the events of the past and those of today. For 
instance, the terrorist group has been slaughtering Shias because it considers them 
heretics and atheists; Hussain and his family were also massacred for the values and 
beliefs that they held. Today, the Islamic State plunders Shias in Iraqi cities such as 
Zawba, similar to how Hussain’s women and children were looted by Yazid’s men after 
the battle. The Islamic State humiliates and strips Shia and other women from minority 
groups of their rights by selling them as slaves in a flourishing market, and putting a price 
on their bodies; after Karbala, Hussain’s women were forcibly paraded in the streets of 
Kufa and Damascus without their hijab, and shown off to a crowd that insulted and 
celebrated the oppression that they were facing. Furthermore, when Saddam Hussein was 
asked about his reasons for killing Shia intellectual and activist Amina Sadr bint al-Huda, 
																																																								
10 Hazelton, Lesley. After the Prophet: the Epic Story of the Shia-Sunni Split in Islam. New York, Doubleday, 2009. 
Hazelton is a British-American author who has extensively worked on Islamic politics and religion. 
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he answered by stating an example from the Battle of Karbala. In fact, it is reported that 
when asked to spare her life, Hussein instantly remarked, “kill the brother and spare the 
sister? You want me to make the same mistake as Yazid?” 11, alluding to the fact that 
Hussain’s sister Zainab became the leader of her brother’s revolutionary movement after 
the Battle of Karbala, while she should have been killed by the caliph of her time. All of 
these examples demonstrate that the event of Karbala, which has not been formally 
recognized through legal means, is used as a tool of reference by anti-Shia groups in 
order to perpetrate human rights violations against a religious sect that has been suffering 
atrocities throughout history. 
 Given the background of continuous Shia targeting in Iraq, the aim of this thesis 
is to provide an analysis of the massacre of Karbala through the theoretical framework of 
transitional justice, and use the mechanisms of truth and reconciliation to attain 
recognition, with the hope that such acknowledgement might help ensure the lasting 
protection of the vulnerable Shia population in Iraq today. Transitional justice is 
recognized as the judicial and non-judicial means of “dealing with the aftermath of 
violent conflicts and human rights abuses in order to provide for a peaceful future.” 12 
The term encompasses actions that not only seek to punish perpetrators by putting them 
on trial, but also focus on victims and society. Transitional justice is a process that helps 
victim societies deal with the legacy of past injustices, and comprises methods such as 
truth commissions, memorialization, education, material and non-material 
compensations, and the construction of a shared historical narrative. In fact, these means 																																																								
11 Al-Sadr, Muhammad Baqir. A General Outlook at Rituals: A Study in the Philosophy of Islamic Rites. Washington, 
D.C.: Islamic Revival Movement, 1981. 
12 Bonacker, Thornsten, and Susanne Buckley-Zistel. "Introduction: Transitions from Violence – Analyzing the Effects 
of Transitional Justice." International Journal of Conflict and Violence 7.1 (2013): 4-9.  
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of recognition are centered on the victims rather than the perpetrators. One of the most 
important aspects of transitional justice is that it does not solely recognize the wrongs 
perpetrated on the direct victims of atrocities, but also addresses the burdens of the past 
that an entire community has to bear in the aftermath of a conflict. The recognition of 
historical injustices is primordial in order to ensure the viability, peace and security of a 
people that has lived a violent past. In fact, according to Elazar Barkan, “the denial of a 
historical narrative of gross violations of human rights and suffering is often an affront to 
national identity and is a sure prescription for inciting conflict.”13 Recognizing and 
guaranteeing non-occurrence of the atrocities at Karbala through the mechanisms of 
transitional justice is thus a way of honoring the identity of today’s Shia population, 
addressing its call for acknowledgment, and making a first step towards durable peace 
and lasting protection against human rights atrocities in Iraq and elsewhere. 
 
History and Past Grievances: At the Heart of the Islamic State’s Anti-Shia 
Policies in Iraq Today 
 
 In 2014, Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani, the Islamic State spokesperson, used 
matching violent and sectarian rhetoric regarding the treatment of Iraqi Shias as al-
Baghdadi constantly does in his speeches. The Islamic State’s approach to history and its 
use of past events to fuel contemporary conflicts stand as vivid examples of the 
importance of history in present-day situations, and show that the Shias are under the 
threat of reliving another Karbala as a result of ancestral grudges. On September 21, 
																																																								
13 Barkan, Elazar. “Historical Dialogue and the Prevention of Atrocity Crimes,” in Rosenberg, Sheri’s Reconstructing 
Atrocity Prevention. Cambridge University Press, 2015. Barkan is a Professor of International and Public Affairs and 
the Director of the Human Rights Concentration at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs.  
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2014, al-‘Adnani issued a lengthy statement in which he called for repetitive attacks on 
Shia families and homes, tacitly referring to the settlement of political grudges and 
historical scores and making the strategy of Shia targeting a key component of the 
Islamic State’s insurgency. He stated in his declaration, “O Sunnis of Iraq, the time has 
come for you to learn from the lessons of the past, and to learn that nothing will work 
with the Rafidah other than slicing their throats and striking their necks.” 14  He went on 
to command that a range of human rights violations be perpetrated against them, ordering 
the soldiers of the Islamic State to “raid their homes. Cut off their heads. Do not let them 
feel secure. Hunt them wherever they may be. Turn their worldly life into fear and fire. 
Remove their families from their homes and thereafter blowup their homes.” 15  
 Al-Adnani and al-Baghdadi’s threats, mainly animated by a Salafi-Jihadi religious 
ideology, historical grievances, as well as the desire to create and retain a traditional 
historical caliphate inhabited by a “legitimate” constituency, set the grounds for the 
selective killing and oppression of Iraqi Shias. The attacks led by the terrorist group have 
constantly targeted not solely the Shia militia, but the civil population and their places of 
worship as well. By destroying seven Shia sacred places and shrines in June 2014, as 
stated in a report issued by Human Rights Watch 16, the Islamic State has explicitly 
violated Shia believers’ right to religious practice in public and private, and their freedom 
to manifest their beliefs in worship, practice and observance as dictated in Article 18 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 17 and the corresponding article of the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Furthermore, according to reports and news 																																																								
14 Spencer, Robert. The Complete Infidel's Guide to ISIS. Washington DC: Regnery, 2015. Print. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Iraq: ISIS Kidnaps Shia Turkmen, Destroys Shrines. Rep. Human Rights Watch, 27 June 2014. 
17 Enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the fundamental right to religious freedom is articulated in 
Article 18.  
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articles, the Islamic State frequently executes Shias, sometimes through mass killings as 
occurred in the city of Tikrit, and engages in selective targeting by checking the identity 
cards of their captives and separating Shias from Sunnis, based on their patronymics. The 
group does not make any sort of distinction between combatants and civilians, or men, 
women and children during the attacks, which thus qualify as war crimes and crimes 
against humanity under the Statute of the International Criminal Court and the four 
Geneva Conventions 18, which are important in times of warfare. From the beginning of 
the group’s involvement in Iraq under the leadership of Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi until 
today, the Shias have been a constant target of the Islamic State and have been suffering 
from its oppressive practices and repetitive persecution.   
 Historical grievances and sentiments of revenge have certainly been significant in 
encouraging violence against the Shias. According to Barkan, the role of history becomes 
more apparent in conflicts when those are shaped more by “local animosities, regional 
considerations, popular myths and ethnic interests” 19 than global politics. Alexander 
Aviña, in an attempt to explain the rationale behind sectarian and selective violence, has 
found that past specters of insurgencies who have not been successful at attaining a 
certain political goal, have left a legacy of unanswered grievances and sentiments of 
revenge that help mobilize future generations to take action, and fulfill the promise that 
their ancestors could not. Giving the example of the guerillas during the Mexican 
Revolution of 1910, he theorizes that the former “learned that unredeemed longings, 
aspirations and vengeance could mobilize a robust base of popular support for guerilla 
																																																								
18 For instance, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides an extensive definition of crimes against 
humanity and war crimes in Articles 7 and 8 respectively.  
19 Barkan, Elazar. “Historical Dialogue and the Prevention of Atrocity Crimes.” Reconstructing Atrocity Prevention. 
Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
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insurgency.” 20 At the same time, Aviña stipulates that leaders of armed groups and their 
supporters can communicate and share a specific ideology based on a framework created 
by “shared historical experiences, memories, blood ties, and dialogue,” 21 which enables 
them to carry out violence on a specific group based on quasi-homogeneous incentives. 
Furthermore, in his study of political violence, Stathis Kalyvas finds that most of the 
time, if not always, violence is carried out locally and personally on an intimate level. He 
hypothesizes that insurgents often use the opportunity of a civil conflict to satisfy their 
thirst for vengeance, settle ancestral scores, and fulfill historical promises of retribution. 
As he writes regarding civil wars, they “can be understood as processes that provide a 
medium for a variety of grievances to be realized within the greater conflict, particularly 
through violence.” 22 
 An example of this is the 1915 Armenian genocide, where one of the reasons for 
the killing of the Armenians was based on history. Eric D. Weitz writes that “modern 
genocides (…) are the result of political decisions executed at moments of crisis, but they 
are also embedded in complex historical processes.” 23 Indeed, a decline in the power of 
the Ottoman Empire and military defeats experienced in the early stages of World War I 
caused the ruling power to label the minority Armenian population, which occupied 
important positions in the economy, as scapegoats and the ones accountable for the 
empire’s loss of glory in the midst of contemporary European hegemony. Another more 
well-known and well-studied example is, of course, Hitler’s targeting of the Jews during 
																																																								
20 Aviña, Alexander. Specters of Revolution: Peasant Guerrillas in the Cold War Mexican Countryside. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2014. Aviña is a Professor of History at Florida State University.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Kalyvas, Stathis. “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars.” Perspective on Politics 
1(3): 475-494. 2003. Kalyvas is Arnold Wolfers Professor of Political Science at Yale University.  
23 Weitz, Eric D. A Century of Genocide: Utopian Race and Nation. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003. 
Weitz is Distinguished Professor of History at the City College of New York.   
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World War II, where past enmity against the Jews and Aryanism fueled the Nazis’ racial 
policies and led to the Holocaust. Not only did Hitler blame the Jews for all of 
Germany’s political, social and economic issues, but he also described them as “the 
Jewish virus (…) how many diseases have their origin in the Jewish virus! We shall 
regain our health only by eliminating the Jew.” 24  He also made a reference to the lessons 
and “errors” of the past, errors that must not be committed in the Third Reich, in Mein 
Kampf  by writing that “history shows with terrifying clarity that in every mingling of the 
Aryan blood with that of lower peoples, the result was the end of the cultured people.” 25 
Furthermore, Mike McGovern applies Kalyvas’ theory in his study of political violence 
in Côte d’Ivoire, and explains that the motives of armed groups are heterogeneous and 
often include the settlement of scores. While some members take part in the conflict in 
order to protect their home communities and minority groups such as women participate 
for the adventure of being fighters, others join in order “to avenge the deaths of loved 
ones.” 26 Citing Paul Collier, McGovern concludes that “gradually, the composition of 
the rebel group will shift from idealists to opportunists to sadists.” 27  These theories of 
rational violence can be applied to the Islamic State and its treatment of the Iraqi Shia 
majority today as the group makes it clear in its statements that it uses past historical 
grievances, based on religious, political and sectarian strife, to fuel and justify the 
mistreatment of the sect. 
																																																								
24 Weitz, Eric D. A Century of Genocide: Utopian Race and Nation. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003. 
Weitz is Distinguished Professor of History at the City College of New York.   
25 Ibid.	
26 McGovern, Mike. “Popular Development Economics—An Anthropologist among the Mandarins.” Perspectives on 
Politics 9(2): 345-355. 2011. McGovern is a Professor of Political Anthropology at the University of Michigan.  
27 Collier, Paul. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It. New 
York: Harper Perennial, 2009. Collier is Professor of Economics at the University of Oxford.  
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 In fact, alienating discourse against the Shias from the rebel group has often 
carried distinct reference to history, and it is due to this instrumental rhetoric that Iraqi 
Sunnis, many of them trapped in the conflict, now regard Shias as opponents. For 
instance, during a sermon delivered at a Fallujah mosque in July 2015, an Islamic State 
cleric swore that the conflict had no other root but an ideological one. He stated in front 
of an audience of combatants but also Sunni civilians, “you should know, oh servants of 
Allah that our enmity with the Rafidites (Shias) and the Zoroastrian Persians is not of a 
material or political nature. It is an ideological enmity that goes back a long time.” 28 This 
ideological feud obviously refers to the succession of ‘Ali and the consequent division 
that it created. Correspondingly, the Islamic State echoes the words and thoughts of the 
Umayyad army at the time of the massacre of Karbala, which they justified and 
understood as a legitimate act of revenge against ‘Ali, who was known as the most 
valiant warrior on the battlefield and the one who fought and won the battles Badr and 
Ohod against the enemy clans during the time of the Prophet. The opposing armies at the 
time counted several ancestors of the Umayyad dynasty, such as Abu Sufyan and Hind, 
Yazid I’s grandparents. Cheikh Abbass Ghomi reports in Nafass’ol Mahmoum that in the 
aftermath of the battle, Hussain’s family was enslaved and brought to the palace of 
Obeydollah ibn Zyad, the governor of Kufa. Before imprisoning them, the latter 
passionately declared, “today marks my revenge for the day of the Battle of Badr!” 29 
Furthermore, it is recalled by some hadiths of the saga that when Marwan ibn Hakam, the 
governor of Madina, received the severed head of Hussain, he took it to the tomb of the 
																																																								
28 Spencer, Robert. “ISIS Muslim Cleric Tells Shia: “Allah Willing, We Shall Slaughter You Like Sheep.” Jihad 
Watch, 2015 
29 Cheikh Abbas Ghomi’s Nafasul Mahmoom - Relating to the Heart-Rending Tragedy of Karbala (Qum, Ansariyan 
Publications, 2005. Translation by Farideh Mahdavi-Damghani).  The translation of the quote from French is mine.  
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Prophet, violently threw it in the direction of the sepulcher and screamed, “Ô 
Mohammad! Here is our revenge for the fateful day of the Battle of Badr!” 30  Lastly, 
Ghomi relates in his recollection that when the prisoners arrived at the gate of Yazid’s 
residence, they were preceded by soldiers who held long spears on top of which the heads 
of the martyrs were mounted. They entered first and praised Yazid on his 
accomplishment with a comment that held a genocidal connotation. They said, “we swear 
on our honor and the honor of our Emir that we have been able to destroy the race of Abu 
Torab (‘Ali ibn Abi Talib).” 31  This statement, however, is not entirely correct since the 
fourth and fifth Imams, the grandson and great-grandson of ‘Ali respectively, both 
survived the killings and were able to ensure the existence of their ancestor’s progeny. 
The historical enmity that the Islamic State cleric referred to in his sermon is therefore 
not a novelty. As the preceding examples demonstrate, it has been at the heart of political 
and ideological conflicts throughout Islamic history, and continues to hold a central place 
in anti-Shia movements nowadays.     
 In 2005, al-Zarqawi carried out a strategy to provoke further alienation between 
the two groups on the basis of history, and led a campaign to enforce a boycott of the 
upcoming democratic elections in Iraq from the Sunni population. Knowing that after 
“centuries of ill-treatment, a Shia-Sunni reconciliation would prove difficult and that the 
historic distrust between the two communities would remain high,” 32 this political 
strategy was put in place in order to further alienate the Sunni population from the Shia 
majority and proved to be successful, as less than one percent of the Sunnis cast a ballot 
in Anbar, a key province of Iraq. Unsurprisingly, the Shia majority won the election and 																																																								
30 Ibid, pg. 335 
31 Ibid, pg. 353 
32 Micallef, Joseph V. Islamic State: Its History, Ideology & Challenge. Antioch Downs Press, 2015. Kindle 
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Ibrahim al-Jaafari became Prime Minister, consequently receiving the responsibility of 
determining Iraq’s post-war fate. This event marked the peak of Sunni political 
grievances as Iraq’s minority group, and fueled strong feelings of rejection in the Sunni 
population, feelings that have been constantly present in hearts and memories since the 
Great Schism that took place after Prophet Muhammad’s death. The Shias’ victory in the 
elections enabled Zarqawi to present himself as the messiah, born to protect all Sunnis 
against the unjust behavior of the Shias. He called the Shia government a polity that 
would always enforce the sociopolitical grievances of Sunni civilians, and referring to 
history once again, described the Shias as “conspirators in a plot of antique vintage, the 
aim of which was the violent disinheritance of 1.3 billion Sunnis of the Islamic World.”33  
 Moreover, Zarqawi has insisted on holding Shias and their beliefs accountable for 
past historical events, and has portrayed them as antagonists who consistently stood 
against Omayyad and Abbasid Sunni caliphs. In a speech that he made in 2004, he is 
known to have said that the Shias were responsible for the invasion of Muslim territories 
by the Mongols, and the subsequent destruction of Baghdad in the thirteenth century. He 
declared to his audience that the Shias “cooperated with the infidels and the   (…) they 
were the main cause of the invasion of Muslim countries by Genghis Khan (…) they 
enjoy repudiating and cursing Muslim leaders, especially the Orthodox caliphs.” 34 It is 
quite certain that in the course of Islamic history since the Great Schism, there has always 
been marked opposition in the political and ideological realms between the appointed 
Sunni-denominated caliphs, and the Twelve Shia Imams that the Shias consider the 
legitimate successors of the Prophet, due to the fact they are considered the infallible 
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progeny of the latter. Out of the Twelve Imams, ten of them were poisoned by the caliphs 
of their time. Hussain ibn Ali was murdered during the Battle of Karbala, and 
Mohammed Mahdi, the twelfth Imam, is believed to be the messiah in occultation who 
will return to end tyranny and world injustice. It is known from the analysis of Shia ethos 
that the Imams are “considered to have displayed (patient endurance of suffering) for at 
least part of their lives and the popular religious practices particularly emphasize the 
wrongs that they suffered at the hands of the Umayyad and ‘Abbasid governments.” 35 In 
Avina’s theory, the Sunni-denominated caliphs of history might have become “those 
specters (who) at times demand revenge,” 36 whose goals are being carried out by the 
Islamic State as unsatisfied historical grievances.    
 
Going Back in the History of Shia Persecution: From the Islamic State to the 
Regime of Saddam Hussain 
 
 It is certainly not the first time in contemporary conflicts that Shias are being 
portrayed as heretics and apostates, or shunned for the religious values and beliefs that 
they hold by individuals and groups who relate to the Salafi ideology or make use of 
instrumental ideology for political purposes. Once again, the Shia-Sunni schism, which 
had already slowly begun after the Prophet’s death due to differences of opinion over his 
succession, is still a reality and is being used by extremist groups to encourage sectarian 
violence between both denominations. As Joseph Micallef affirms, the Islamic State’s 
involvement in Iraq has “made (it) the epicenter of a broader Sunni-Shia rivalry that 																																																								
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Oxford University Press, 2014.  
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threatens to plunge the Muslim world into a global conflict.” 37 Despite the fact that 
international human rights law grants religious freedom to all individuals in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and Article 18 of the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, and the Islamic doctrine actually protects religious minorities and their right to 
practice as conscience dictates 38, the normative ideology of the Islamic State prescribes 
that the Shia should be held accountable and punished for following a path of Islam that 
represents a false truth from a Sunni perspective, and also for supporting a government 
other than that of the Islamic State. In July 2014, the spokesman of the terrorist 
organization instrumentalized a verse of the Qur’an in order to legitimize the group’s 
targeting of the Shias for ideological and political purposes. The answer, he said, resided 
in the Qur’an, in which God “speaks about the nearby enemy - those Muslims who have 
become infidels - as they are more dangerous than those who are already infidels.” 39 
Furthermore, thirteen-century theologian and founder of the Salafi branch, Ibn 
Taymiyyah, whose teachings form the basis of the Islamic State’s ideology and actions, 
has made clear that the Shias must be fought. He affirms, “beware of the Shiites, fight 
them, they lie.” 40  In a letter addressed to Ben Laden in 2004, former ISIS leader al-
Zarqawi did not hide his desire to fight, oppress, humiliate, and engage in offensive jihad 
against Iraqi Shias, whom he considered “the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking snake, 
the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying enemy, and the penetrating venom.” 41 The 
unlawful and oppressive treatment of the Shia army and civil population by the Islamic 
																																																								
37 Micallef, Joseph V. Islamic State: Its History, Ideology & Challenge. Antioch Downs Press, 2015. Micallef is a 
military historian and commentator on international politics.  
38 The Qur’an, which is the final word of God for all Muslims, summarizes the notion of religious freedom in one well-
known verse, among many others: “let there be no compulsion in religion” (Qur’an 2:256).   
39 Benari, Elad. 2014. “ISIS: Fighting ‘Infidels’ Takes Precedence over Fighting Israel.” Arutz Sheva.   
40 Weiss M. and Hassan H. ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. New York: Regan Arts, 2015.  
41 Ibid.  
	 21	
State, being based on a normative and instrumental religious ideology that forms the core 
of the group’s motives, still continues to this day with impunity and can be traced back 
even further to the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein.  
 In order to prove that Shia targeting has been consistent in Iraq during times of 
conflict under independent governments, it is perhaps fitting to note, as another example, 
that the sect was constantly at the heart of Sunni-dominated Ba’ath Party leader Saddam 
Hussein’s (himself a Sunni) divisive policies and common orders of mass executions 
during his 24-year long rule. Wanting to consolidate his power after taking over the 
presidency in 1979, Saddam led a series of discriminatory practices against the Shia 
majority in order to keep them away from the political and social scenes, such as 
forbidding the marja’iyya, the highest authority of the Shias, to play a role in the 
government or banning Ashura processions which had become a political manifestation 
against tyranny. Schools were no longer allowed to include Shia Islam in the curriculum 
and many powerful clerics from Iranian decent were expelled and sent back to Iran, in the 
fear that they might stage a coup d’état against the regime with the support of the Iranian 
government. Apart from the fact that Saddam suppressed the Shia majority from 
acquiring any political power, he was also guilty of numerous human rights violations 
against them that were later recognized before the law as crimes against humanity. While 
actual numbers cannot be given with certainty, as no international or national 
investigations regarding executions and disappearances have ever been documented, “the 
forceful removal of an estimated 140,000 Shi’a from the Marshland region on the Iranian 
border” 42 is an indisputable fact that violates international customary humanitarian law, 
Additional Protocols I and II, and Articles 3 and 27 of the Geneva Convention (IV), 																																																								
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which concern the prevention of the forceful displacement of civilians. The Dujail case, 
in which Saddam had been sentenced to death before the decision was reconsidered, 
proved that he had reviewed and approved the execution of 148 people from the Shia-
populated town of Dujail. Ever since the coup d’état of 1968, in which Saddam played a 
decisive role before ascending to power eleven years later, the Shias’ cultural, religious 
and political rights have been restrained. Targeting against the Shia civil population had 
been especially more persistent during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980 and the Gulf War of 
1991. During the eight-year long Iran-Iraq War, Saddam ordered the imprisonment and 
killing of 300,000 Shia young men who he accused of being part of al-Dawa, the largest 
underground political organization, as well as the forcible relocation of “tens of 
thousands of Shia (…) to Iran” 43, fearing that they might form a coalition with Iran’s 
Shia-dominated government and threaten to overthrow the ruling Ba’ath Party. The 
divisive ideology that was used by Saddam to legitimize Iraq’s invasion of Iran led to the 
institutionalization of sectarian identities and generated conflicts over each group’s 
power, status, and border claims. This geopolitical strategy not only affected Shia-Sunni 
relations and the outcome of the war, but also contributed to the tense sectarian climate 
that is central to the success of the Islamic State in the region today, as “sectarianism 
remains a tool employed to achieve political and geostrategic advantages and ultimately, 
regional dominance.” 44  
 In 1980, in order to maintain political hegemony and prevent any opposing action 
against his government, Saddam ordered that Shi’a cleric and respected leader Grand 
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Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr be imprisoned, tortured and murdered after the 
publication of a defense of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. It has been reported that he was 
killed with an iron hammered into his head, after being forced to watch his sister Amina 
Sadr bint al-Huda’s torture and murder. 45 Additionally, in the wake of the Gulf War, 
Hussein violated international principles of civilian protection in times of war, as laid 
down in the Geneva Conventions, by ordering the destruction of shrines, homes, shops 
and religious institutions in Karbala, due to the emotional, historical and religious 
importance the city retained for Shias. At the same time, “Shia uprisings in the South 
were repressed by the Iraqi military, and thousands were killed and injured by 
indiscriminate firing in residential areas,” 46 and the shrines of Hussain and ‘Abbas in 
Karbala, where the headquarters of the insurgents were located, were severely damaged.  
During the time of the war, the Iraqi military continued to target Shia insurgents and 
civilians, both in Southern villages and along the Iranian border, and destroyed several 
mosques and places of worship, as well as sacred Shia manuscripts. As demonstrated by 
Saddam Hussein’s regime and the Islamic State’s violent rhetoric, which are fueled by 
historical enmity and divisions, it can be asserted that Iraqi Shias, sometimes referred to 
as “Iraq’s oppressed majority,” have been persecuted and denied legitimate political 
power and involvement throughout their country’s conflictual history for nearly a 
century. 47  
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The Roots of Shia Oppression in History: An Overview of The Battle of Karbala, 
Its Human Rights Violations and the Call for Justice   
 
 The Battle of Karbala arguably marks the beginning of Shia oppression in Islamic 
history, but has never been recognized through legal means for the various human rights 
violations and atrocities that were perpetrated during the conflict, and in its aftermath. As 
has been previously explained, the event retains importance for both the victims and the 
perpetrators. While Shias continue to commemorate and deplore the injustices that 
Hussain and his family had to face, anti-Shia groups, such as the Islamic State, use 
Karbala’s symbol and the fact that it has never been acknowledged to continue their 
oppression on the Shia population with impunity. It must be kept in mind that the 
narratives of the Battle of Karbala are derived from Shia sources, given the importance 
and religious affiliation that the event holds for the Shia community, as opposed to the 
Sunni one. It should be noted that the story, as told in a Shia point of view, might be 
biased or exaggerated due to the strong religious sentiments that are tied to the battle, and 
that the information, being set far back in time, is impossible to verify. Given these 
limitations, the following account of the event is based on Cheikh Abbas Ghomi’s 
Nafasul Mahmoom - Relating to the Heart-Rending Tragedy of Karbala, which is one of 
the most widely used narrative of Karbala by Shia scholars.  
 In 680 A.D, Hussain ibn Ali led a revolutionary social justice movement against 
Omayyad caliph Yazid I and refused to swear allegiance to his corrupt government. 
According to surviving sources, Yazid I, who was a fierce enemy of Ali ibn Abi Talib, 
was described from the Shia perspective as “morally corrupt, religiously impious, and 
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politically oppressive.” 48  This description is supported by many Sunni historians 
including Ibn Kathir 49 and al-Dhahabi 50, who describe Yazid as “a drunkard who openly 
ridiculed and flouted the laws of Islam.” 51 Hussain, on the other hand, was the grandson 
of the Prophet Muhammad and could not approve of a leader and government that upheld 
unjust social and political practices in the name of Islam. As he stated himself, “I am not 
rising against Yazid as an insolent or an arrogant person, or as a mischief-monger, or 
tyrant. I have risen against Yazid as I seek to reform the Ummah (Islamic Nation) of my 
grandfather. I wish to bid the good and forbid the evil.”52     
  Oppressed under Yazid’s dictatorial regime, the people of Kufa, a city in Southern 
Iraq, soon sent letters and messengers to Hussain in Madina, urging him to assume 
leadership and assuring him of their loyal support. Hussain refused to swear allegiance to 
Yazid, and after receiving letters from his supporters, sent his cousin Muslim ibn Aqil to 
Kufa to confirm the population’s loyalty and support for his cause. In Kufa, large 
meetings took place and thousands of people pledged allegiance to Hussain. Learning of 
this, Hussain left the city of Medina with about fifty armed companions, his women and 
the children of his family. However, at the same time, the situation in Kufa changed. 
Yazid, upon hearing echoes of a planned rebellion against his government, sent 
Obeydollah ibn Zyad to take control of the town and instigate a reign of terror. Ibn Zyad 
brutally suppressed any sign of revolt, and ordered the capture and execution of Muslim 																																																								
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ibn Aqil. Anyone who showed support for Hussain was threatened with the same 
treatment. Armies were posted at the gates of Kufa and on southern routes to intercept 
Hussain’s caravan, and military units received orders to block all the routes and issues in 
and out of the city to prevent anyone from leaving and joining Hussain’s movement.  
 Hussain’s party was stopped by a detachment of the Umayyad army and led to the 
scalding plain of Karbala, where ibn Zyad sent an army of four thousand men led by 
‘Umar ibn Sa’d with instructions not to allow Hussain to leave before he had taken the 
oath of allegiance to Yazid. Hussain and his men were surrounded by a large army of at 
least 30,000 men, and denied water from the Euphrates River for three days. After trying 
to negotiate for a settlement and a return to Madina, to which ‘Umar ibn Sa’d did not 
agree, ibn Zyad sent his army orders to attack Hussain immediately. It is reported in the 
most widely accepted narratives of Karbala that Hussain pleaded for food and water for 
his children and tried to convince the army through powerful speeches, but his demands 
were rejected and met with violent responses. For instance, one way in which the army 
responded to his plea for water was by murdering Hussain’s six-month-old infant, 
Abdallah, with a poisonous arrow. Along with his small army of 72 companions, Hussain 
was brutally massacred along with his family members on the tenth day of the Islamic 
month of Muharram, now known as Ashura. His body and those of his companions were 
ran over by horses, stripped of all clothing and pieces of jewelry and decapitated.  
 In the aftermath of the battle, following Hussain and his companions’ martyrdom, 
“Yazid’s troops stormed the camp where the women and children were staying, taking 
captives and setting the tents on fire. Those who survived the battle were then taken in 
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chains to Yazid’s court in Damascus.” 53  It is also narrated in Ghomi’s Nafasul 
Mahmoom that the tents were looted, innocent children killed, and women deprived from 
their hijab and paraded in the streets of Kufa and Shaam, which symbolized the greatest 
form of humiliation, as they were direct relatives and descendants of Prophet 
Muhammad. Despite the warning that Hussain grave during the battle, calling out “O 
family of Abu Sufyan! If religion does not move you, are you not restrained by your 
sense of shame that you molest my women?” 54, the army insisted on dishonoring the 
women by forcefully entering and pillaging their tents. After Karbala, Hussain’s message 
of truth and social justice was defended by his sister Zainab bint Ali and his son Ali ibn 
Hussain, who did not participate in the battle due to the fact that he was ill with 
dysentery. Fearing outrage from the Muslim community, Yazid decided not to kill the 
remaining members of Hussain’s family but rather, send them back to Madina.  
 The Sunni perspective on the story is difficult to examine, due to the fact that the 
Battle of Karbala does not occupy a central event in Sunni thought and is not given 
religious affiliation or importance. In general terms, Sunnis acknowledge that the 
massacre took place, but also point to the fact that the evidence on what truly happened 
and who bears responsibility is quite inconclusive, and cannot be concretely analyzed. 
While they agree that Yazid was not a righteous caliph, the majority of Sunnis have 
varied opinions regarding the nature of Hussain’s movement and Yazid’s culpability in 
Hussain’s death. For instance. Dr. Yasir Qadhi, a prominent American Sunni cleric and 
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public figure, argued in a 2013 audio speech 55 that the massacre was primarily the 
responsibility of the people of Kufa, and while Yazid was a tyrant, a rebellion against his 
government was not necessarily in the best interest of the Islamic community at the time. 
Other Sunni authorities have claimed that Hussain did not actively revolt against Yazid, 
or that Yazid should not be given responsibility for Hussain’s murder, which was ordered 
by Obeydollah ibn Zyad For instance, Sunni theologian al-Ghazali, whose works have 
earned him the title “Proof of Islam”, mentions in Ihya’ Ulum al-Din that “it is certain 
that Yazid was a Muslim, but it is not certain that he slew Hussain or that he ordered or 
consented to his death, and as long as these circumstances remain uncertain, it is not 
allowable to believe that he acted so.” 56 On the other hand, Ibn Jarir Al-Tabari, a 
renowned Sunni scholar whose commentary on Islamic history is unanimously 
recognized by Sunni historians and biographers, has based his recollection of the Karbala 
narrative 57 on the reports provided by Shia scholar Abu Mikhnaf, which makes the 
former quite similar to the Shia version. The different interpretations of history offered by 
scholars from both Shia and Sunni denominations have led to the emergence of 
competing historical narratives that give way to varied perceptions of the same event 
from both religious groups.  
 The event of Karbala is not solely remembered by the Shia community for its 
ferocity as a battle. While the occurrence of the event is accepted by the Sunni population 
and used as a tool for oppression by anti-Shia, the battle is mourned and remembered by 
the Shias for the countless injustices that were perpetrated against Hussain and his family, 
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injustices that have not yet been satisfactorily recognized mainly by the Sunni majority 
and their authorities. In the Zyarat Nahiyah, it is affirmed that Hussain was martyred 
without justice, as the verses “peace be upon the one whose rights and dignity were 
violated, peace be upon the one whose blood was shed unjustly” 58 suggest. Thus, every 
year on the tenth of Muharram, Shia believers mourn the martyrdom of Hussain and the 
calamities that befell him and his relatives in different ways across cultures and 
traditions. From marching to Karbala by foot to visit the holy shrine of Hussain to crying 
for him during sermons and reading eulogies 59, the Shias live up to their historical 
memory and commemorate Hussain’s death, recognizing the human rights violations that 
not only resonate with the Shia community but fall under core principles of international 
human rights law, which will be analyzed in the subsequent sections. From a religious 
ritual, the Battle of Karbala has taken a political dimension, and empowers Iraqi Shias to 
emulate Hussain’s behavior and fight against tyranny even in contemporary times. The 
emulation of the actions of Hussain is an additional proof that Shia communities do not 
want to forget, and still bear the burdens of history.   
 In the face of the escalating persecution against the Shia population by the Islamic 
State, the symbol of Karbala has become a weapon against oppression, and the 
revolutionary movement of Hussain is the banner that Shia fighters and civilians hold as a 
tool for resistance. During this year’s Ashura commemorations in Iraq, at least 41 people 
were killed and 33 injured in a suicide attack in a Baghdad market 60, and while the 
Islamic State has been targeting Shias, particularly during this important religious 																																																								
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festival, the latter have not stopped marching to Karbala in order to pay their respects to 
Hussain, the saint who stood up for social justice. Ayatollah Sistani, the most prominent 
cleric and religious voice for Iraqi Shias, has urged believers to resist for the same values 
that Hussain held, to protect religious minorities notably those in the Nineveh province, 
and engage in defensive combat that would not compromise Islamic principles, and that 
would respect the principles of international law. Interestingly, he adamantly forbade the 
Shia resistance to carry out any actions similar to those of the Islamic State, which 
ultimately resemble those perpetrated against Hussain in Karbala and qualify as gross 
human rights violations.  
 Indeed, in an official statement released in February 2015, he advised Shia 
militias to refrain from condemning others to heresy and to respect the sanctity of the 
lives of noncombatants. He also implicitly referred to the violations carried out during the 
Battle of Karbala, urging the militias not to “disrespect the corpse of the dead, and if you 
defeat the men of your enemies, do not violate the sanctity of their women and houses 
(…) do not verbally abuse their women. Do not insult their honor, even if your enemies 
abuse your women and insult your honor. Do not deprive any people (…) of their rights 
(…) Do not resort to oppression.” 61 While all Shia militias have not respected those 
conditions, the resistance movement of the Iraqi majority against the Islamic State is 
nevertheless anchored to the notion of a just revolution, a standard set by the Battle of 
Karbala.  
 Hussain, his companions, and his women have become a primordial part of the 
Shia ethos. Hussain stands as a role model and has inspired the Shia attitude of qiyam, 																																																								
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which signifies arising to take a stand against injustice. During the Iranian Revolution of 
1979 and despite the Khomeini regime’s human rights violations 62, religious and 
political authorities used the qiyam of Hussain to empower ordinary Shia citizens, who 
eagerly prepared themselves to rise against the Shah’s government. Following Hussain’s 
footsteps and answering the call for justice that he made on the plains of Karbala 1400 
years ago is a life goal that religious Shias seek to fulfill as part of their ethics. The 
pledge of allegiance to Hussain is given by the Shias in several religious salutations and 
eulogies that are recited daily for an increase in spirituality and proximity to God. In the 
Zyarat Ashura, a eulogy narrated in honor of Hussain and believed to be enshrined in the 
Heavens, the Shias affirm their support for their Imam and address him in terms such as, 
“may my father and mother be sacrificed for you (…) I am at peace with those who make 
peace with you and I am at war with those who make war with you until the Day of 
Judgment.” 63 In an interview conducted by Andrew Cockburn in Karbala during the 
celebration for the birthday of the Twelfth Imam, his guide and influential Iraqi 
pharmacist Ala’a Baqir wishes to act upon the words of the Zyarat and affirms, “he 
(Hussain) is for justice, and people think we are losing that in our own time. We are 
ready to fight at any time for Imam Hussain.” 64   
 The call for justice and recognition of the human rights violations at Karbala 
should not be solely deduced from Shia commemorative practices or stated life goals. In 
fact, it is present in the traditions and daily invocations as well. An entire part of Shia 
belief is centered on the conviction that justice for Hussain and his family must and will 																																																								
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be rendered in this life and the hereafter. Many hadiths, or oral reports, state that when 
the Twelfth Imam, the Mahdi, will reappear as a messiah, one of his missions on Earth 
will consist of avenging the blood of Hussain and his companions, and the oppression 
that the women and children had to face including the violation of their dignity and 
honor. Sheikh Tusi narrates in his Book of Occultation that the Mahdi will be from the 
progeny of Hussain, and will come back to settle scores with the Umayyad who 
participated in the massacre of Karbala. He reports a hadith from Ali ibn Hussain, which 
says, “the Awaited Savior is from the progeny of Hussain ibn Ali, from the children of 
Hussain, and from the heirs of Hussain. Hussain is the victim, about whom Allah said: 
…and whoever is slain unjustly, We have indeed given to his heir (…) authority.” 65 
Several verses in the Zyarat Ashura reiterate that his sacrifice has never been avenged 
and that the Mahdi will seek vengeance for it. The salutation states, “Peace be upon you, 
Ô the one who has been killed and whose blood has not yet been avenged (…) I pray to 
Allah that He grant me the opportunity to seek your revenge with the victorious Imam 
from the family of Muhammad.” 66 In the Zyarat Nahiyah, Imam Mahdi himself is 
believed to have said, “make me victorious over the transgressors” in relation to the 
justice that will be rendered to Hussain. The Shias fervently believe that Fatima, 
Hussain’s mother, will be the mistress of intercessions on the Day of Judgment and will 
ask for redemption for all those who cried for Hussain. ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib reports a hadith 
from the Prophet that describes Fatima on the Day of Judgment, as she will pass among 
the crowd, holding Hussain’s shirt still saturated with blood. According to this tradition, 
																																																								
65 Al-Tusi, Abu Jafar Muhammad ibn al-Hassan. Sheikh Tusi’s Book of Occultation. Qum: Ansariyan Publications, 
2012. Sheikh Tusi was a prominent Persian scholar of the Twelver school of Shia Islam.  
66 Zyarat Ashura. https://www.al-islam.org/torch-perpetual-guidance-expose-ziyarat-ashura-ali-asghar-azizi-
tehrani/arabic-english-text-ziyarat 
	 33	
recalled by al-Qunduzi in his hadith book Yanabi al-Muwadda, she will embrace one leg 
of the Divine Throne and plead to God, “You are the Omnipotent and Just, pass the 
judgment between me and those who killed my son.” 67 Thus, the importance that 
Karbala holds in the collective memory of the Shias and the way in which the symbol 
becomes part of the sect’s actions prove that the conflict and the consequent call for 
justice that it makes need to be addressed.  
 When it comes to Shia prosecution in Iraq, the horrors of history are still being 
carried out freely. One major way of guaranteeing the non-occurrence of a situation 
similar to that of Karbala and to provide the recognition that the Shia community desires 
is to formally acknowledge its human rights violations with the tools of transitional 
justice, which have proven to be effective in the aftermath of violent conflicts. It should 
be emphasized that the value of tears shed in the remembrance of Hussain is 
immeasurable in the Shia tradition. The Shias will never stop crying for Hussain and 
commemorating his martyrdom. Indeed, several Shia hadiths and historical traditions 
report that “anyone who cries for Husayn 68 or causes someone to cry for Husayn shall go 
directly to paradise.” 69 However, this does not mean the call of justice is not real, or that 
the Shias have not lived through a perceived repetition of historical oppression. If the 
recognition of Karbala through the means of transitional justice can become a creative, 
yet perhaps efficient solution to address and help put an end to the human rights 
violations perpetrated on a sect that has long been oppressed, it may be interesting to give 
this particular analysis a chance. Acknowledging the atrocities in Karbala could be a 																																																								
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potential step in achieving justice and dignity for Shia Muslims, and help an entire 
community deal with the legacy of the past. 
 
The Effectiveness of Transitional Justice as a Theoretical Framework: 
Theories, Limitations and Examples  
 
Definition and Description of Transitional Justice  
 The term “transitional justice” was first coined in the 1990s, 70  when the 
international community was confronted with drastic political transitions and regime 
changes in Latin America, the implosion of multiethnic states in a wave of extreme 
nationalism, and the political transformations that were taking place in Central and 
Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. A new wave of democratization soon saw 
the need to apply the rule of law, or post-conflict justice, to violent outbreaks and 
difficult political transitions, which meant establishing the truth, punishing the 
perpetrators, and compensating the victims. The goal of transitional justice is to redress, 
mainly in a national context, the legacies of past human rights violations in order to 
address a society’s demand for the recognition of the latter in the most efficient way. Its 
aim is not only to recognize the suffering of direct victims, who are the main 
protagonists, but also that of the rest of society, especially the concerned communities 
who still bear the burden of historical memories. It should be noted that justice in the 
transitional justice process is defined by the 2004 “The Rule of Law and Transitional 
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies” report as “an ideal of accountability and 
fairness in the protection and vindication of rights and the prevention and punishment of 
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wrongs.” 71 At the same time, the report mentions that justice should not only concern the 
victim, but the well being of society as a whole. The field of transitional justice has 
brought, over the past generation, a shift in the understanding of justice by focalizing on 
its restorative rather punitive aspect, and has worked on redressing past human rights 
violations, attaining acknowledgment for the crimes and the victims’ suffering, 
compensating for past wrongs and preventing future abuses from occurring on a 
population that has already lived, directly or indirectly, in oppression. Transitional 
justice, being strongly connected to liberal values, is an important step in ensuring 
democracy, strengthening the rule of law, and promoting peace. One of its core principles 
is the guarantee of non-occurrence, which it seeks to fulfill by implementing mechanisms 
of truth, reconciliation and reparation. Mariam Salehi and Timothy Williams reinforce 
this claim by assessing the impact of transitional justice on enduring peace using 
qualitative analysis, and finding that while the effects are different depending on the 
nature of conflicts and their contexts, “restorative and retributive justice measures can 
have positive effects on post-conflict peace.” 72 
 Transitional justice can be regarded as a process of redress that can either be 
restorative or retributive. 73 Restorative redress refers to situations in which parties 
voluntarily wish to attain reconciliation through means of negotiation. 74 It includes non-
judicial acts of recognition, such as official apologies by governments, financial 
compensations, the creation of institutions, historical commissions and memorialization 																																																								
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through museums, monuments, or textbooks. Retributive redress, on the other hand, is 
punitive and judicially enforceable. Its primary methods include international and 
national trials, and ad hoc tribunals that are created for definite conflicts in specific times. 
75 Truth commissions, which are an integral part of transitional justice, are located in 
between; in fact, the truth-seeking that they entail via victim testimonials is usually 
voluntary while its compliance practices, such as the dissemination of final reports and 
the recommendable creation of successor organizations that will follow up on the 
implementation of the recommendations, are enforceable in the sense that the mandates 
of truth commissions, without being legally binding, usually advise governments to 
consider policy recommendations seriously. As an example, the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission created in South Africa after the abolition of apartheid created a witness-
protection programme for vulnerable witnesses in order to protect them from the 
consequences that their participation in the truth-telling process might have, and offered a 
safe forum where people had the chance to recall their experiences in public hearings. 
Thornsten Bonacker and Susanne Buckley-Zistel from Phillips University in Marburg 
assess transitional justice with regards to its temporal focus, argue that transitional justice 
is simultaneously focused on the past, the present and the future, and explain that “as a 
past-oriented practice, transitional justice addresses wrongs committed during a conflict. 
As a present-oriented practice, it establishes a new ethical and institutional framework 
and, through this, seeks to prevent the future occurrence of gross injustices and 
violence.”76    
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 Transitional justice is a creative process, as its success is ultimately dependent on 
a community’s cultural understanding of justice, and while the aim remains the same, 
each society must choose the path that addresses its call for justice in an optimal fashion 
through diverse mechanisms. Furthermore, the effects of transitional justice and its 
efficiency can be interpreted in different ways, since “justice (…) will never be a singular 
outcome but is an ongoing relational process involving an exchange between people’s 
‘ideals’ and structural ‘realities’ that limit action.” 77 The ultimate goal of transitional 
justice is to allow a society to move forward after periods of political unrest or violent 
conflicts with a feeling of satisfaction after past violations have been addressed through 
judicial and non-judicial methods. It aims at providing a certain sense of security to a 
community by emphasizing accountability and recognition, and encouraging the 
understanding of a common historical narrative that would abate sectarian tensions and 
feelings of resentment while minimizing the chance of violent outbreaks.  
 Despite the limitations of transitional justice, which are for instance demonstrated 
by Friederike Mieth 78 and Eva Ottendörfer 79 in their studies of Sierra Leone and Timor 
Leste respectively, and the debate on the process’ efficiency and the need to separate 
“utopian dreams and practical possibilities,” 80 transitional justice has proved its relative 																																																																																																																																																																					
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effectiveness in various cases of international human rights law that are more immediate 
than Karbala but still share similar grounds, especially with regards to history as an 
igniting factor. The Rwandan genocide of 1994 81, which claimed more than half a 
million lives and destroyed about ¾ of the Tutsi population, was instigated by ethnic 
tensions based on colonization, historical power-sharing and racial features determined 
by the Belgian colonizers. After decades of animosity based on the retention of political 
power and the so-called superiority of the Tutsis due to their physical features, Hutu 
extremists, along with the Interhamwe militia and ordinary Hutu citizens, started hunting 
down and slaughtering Tutsi men, women and children in what would become one of the 
most efficient and terrifying ethnic cleansing events in the recent history of international 
law. In mid-July 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which was formed in 1987 by Tutsi 
refugees in Uganda and is the current ruling party in Rwanda, overthrew the Hutu-
dominated government and ended the genocide. In its aftermath, Rwanda and the 
international community have made efforts to punish the perpetrators of the atrocities 
through a combination of transitional justice mechanisms, including national tribunals, a 
ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), regular courts, and 
community-based gacaca courts that allowed the local population to participate in the 
justice process. The ICTR, which had a mandate of trying only the suspects who had a 
leading role in the genocide, has succeeded in convicting several prominent figures, such 
as the Rwandan Army Chief of Staff, Augustin Bizimungu. The accountability process in 
Rwandan courts had its chaotic moments, as many elected judges had no prior legal 
experience and judgments regarding convicted criminals were solely based on the locals’ 
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memory of the latters’ actions during the genocide, and relied on hearsay. 82 The process 
was also unsurprisingly hindered by the fact that many perpetrators lied or remained 
silent, which did not help truth seeking and the correct establishment of facts. Gacaca 
courts, which refer to community-based assemblies during which perpetrators would be 
judged by well-respected persons of “integrity” and local judges in front of families and 
neighbors, left a mixed legacy: their positive contributions include their swift processing 
of almost two million cases, local involvement in the judicial process, and the 
opportunity for survivors to get some information about the fate of their families. At the 
same time, they gave victims a chance to live more peacefully alongside perpetrators 
after the process. 83 
 Another example of transitional justice is that of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which 
ethnic conflict broke out in the midst of intense political and economic crisis. The 
conflict in former Yugoslavia, and particularly Bosnia, from 1992 to 1995, had its roots 
in nationalist rhetoric that fueled divisions, fear and mistrust among the territory’s three 
main identity groups, the Muslims, the Serbs and the Croats. More than 100,000 people 
were killed in the conflict and two millions people displaced. The war’s most horrendous 
atrocities occurred in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica, where the Serbs, under the orders 
of commander Ratko Mladic, executed more than 8000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys in 
an act of genocide, and drove out the women and children, an act reminiscent of the 
events of Karbala. In 1993, after getting reports about massacres, rapes, torture in 
detention camps and other atrocities across Yugoslavia, Security Council resolution 827 
established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which 
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would prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law, such as war crimes, committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. 84 The 
achievements of the court with regards to transitional justice include the indictment of 
heads of state, army chiefs and other leaders for their crimes, as well as justice to victims 
by allowing them to testify in court, get answers from perpetrators, and help write the 
narrative of the story through their experiences. At the international level, the ICTY 
represented a step in the creation of the International Criminal Court for individual 
prosecutions, and has contributed precedent to the application of the law of genocide by 
being the first international criminal tribunal with a mandate to prosecute the crime. 85 In 
2000, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which is the international organ 
overseeing the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, advocated the creation of a 
memorial in Srebrenica dedicated to the victims of the July 1995 massacre. While 
Bosnian Serbs, who showed their belief in a competing narrative of the conflict by 
asserting that they had acted in self-defense, resisted the creation of a monument that 
recognized Muslim victimhood and Serbian criminality 86, the OHR nevertheless made a 
decision to create a national memorial cemetery in Srebrenica to provide a burial place 
for those whose bodies had been recovered, and a memory site for the victimized 
community.    
Controversies and Limitations of Transitional Justice   
 While the impact and importance of transitional justice is not to be neglected, the 
controversies and limitations of the process should equally be addressed. First of all, a 																																																								
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process of transitional justice is usually initiated by national government legislation, 
carried out by formal institutions, and sponsored by international organizations such as 
the International Center for Transitional Justice, which is dedicated to pursuing 
accountability for victims of human rights abuse though the means of transitional justice. 
In addition the difficulties of obtaining a formal agreement to carry out a process of 
transitional justice and deciding on the specific mechanisms that would be used most 
efficiently, the cost of such proceedings often proves to be a deterrent, especially during 
the process, which puts irreconcilable constraints on the agents and stops transitional 
justice mechanisms from achieving their full potential of success. It should be noted as 
well that while widespread support for transitional justice and the facilitation of its 
mechanisms is usually seen in the aftermath of political transitions, it is less present in 
post-conflict situations, as the regional truth commission in the former Yugoslavia, which 
was never concretized from any side of the conflict due to the dissolution of the 
mandating presidential office, showed.  
 States might also prove to be reticent vis à vis transitional justice for two main 
reasons: official apologies that are usually helpful to the process, and financial 
compensations that, while not being necessary, are often used as effective mechanisms. 
An official apology equals formal recognition of wrongdoings by state governments, 
which most of them choose to avoid and deny in embarrassment if the regimes are still 
made up of the perpetrator’s side. For instance, it is only in 1988 after strong 
campaigning by Japanese-American activists such as Yuri Kochiyama that Ronald 
Reagan signed the Civil Liberties Act, which offered each Japanese-American a formal 
apology and $20,000 dollars in compensation for the internment that they were subject to 
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after the bombing of Pearl Harbor during World War II. Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen 
of Finland apologized to the Jewish community for the extradition of eight Jews to 
Germany in 1942 on November 7, 2000, or 58 years after the event took place. West 
German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s gesture 87 at the site of the Warsaw ghetto in 1970, 
when he fell on his knees to express guilt and responsibility on behalf Germany for the 
Holocaust, was not well received by the German population, which refused to face the 
embarrassment that accompanied the public acknowledgment of the state’s wrongdoings. 
The idea of financial reparations to victims during transitional justice also makes states 
uncomfortable, as victims can be granted monetary compensation for past suffering as 
part of restorative justice mechanisms even years after the occurrence of the conflict. For 
instance, Czech Financial Assistance Fund made a payment of $55 million in total to 
Nazi victims in 1994, and the negotiated Germany-Israel Reparations Agreement still 
enables Jewish Holocaust survivors living in Israel to receive a monthly pension of 
approximately $250 to $1395. While it is rarely used, monetary compensation can be 
seen as the most direct way of alleviating victims’ suffering, and is a component of 
transitional justice that asks for a considerable financial contribution from states.  
 Secondly, transitional justice gives high importance to accountability and 
punishment of perpetrators. Therefore, its limitation resides in the fact that it focuses first 
and foremost on recent conflicts, especially those in which the aggressors are still alive 
and can be brought to justice. Rather than being concerned with historical issues that go 
back a long time, the process is usually used for dealing with the immediate past when it 
comes to rendering justice. Barkan, for instance, writes about truth commission 
mechanisms that “there are no good examples of truth commissions that addressed 																																																								
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historical issues going further back in time than the immediately preceding violent 
period.” 88 For instance, the Guatemala Commission for Historical Clarification, which 
was created to clarify the human rights violations that were perpetrated against the 
Guatemalans in an internal conflict that lasted 1960 to 1996, was also asked to work for 
the preservation of the victims’ memories, and tried to include several reports by 
historians on patterns of historical violence. These individual contributions, however, 
were not included in the analysis or the writing of the final report. The Truth, Justice, and 
Reconciliation commission in Kenya, which had the responsibility of collecting evidence 
of human rights abuses during post-election violence in Kenya from 1963 to 2008, was 
not given the means or methodology to investigate the history of decades of violence. In 
contrast to truth commissions, which do not always give primacy to historical analysis, 
historical commissions have the role of retelling a historical narrative in an objective 
manner and with the agreement of all commission members who represent each side of 
the conflict. Eva-Clarita Pettai concisely defines a historical truth commission as “an ad 
hoc academically grounded body of inquiry set up by state institutions to revisit historical 
records and facts about wrongs committed many decades earlier; to engage in research 
and interpretive negotiations in a rather closed environment and to produce a joint report 
that offers a more diversified and critical narrative of past events.” 89  Thus, despite the 
limitations of transitional justice in addressing older historical conflicts, its mechanisms 
can be adapted and used to analyze historical instances of human rights abuses such as 
Karbala.   																																																								
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 A third limitation of transitional justice with regards to historical crimes is that it 
is often unable to make the distinction between crimes perpetrated under an authoritarian 
regime, and crimes carried out solely during the time of a certain conflict. Barkan writes 
that no methodology is employed to deal with those distinct types of violence, which can 
be dangerous especially if the conflict is between identity groups. 90 In these cases, when 
the conflict is over but groups have not gone through a reconciliation process or the 
understanding of a shared narrative, the memory of violence and sectarian identity 
remains, which makes the groups prone to renewed hostilities in the future, based on 
lingering feelings of animosity. This claim has been demonstrated by the memory of 
Karbala that is present in both Shia and anti-Shia consciences, given the fact that a shared 
understanding of history has never been encouraged. The Balkan Wars of the 1990s offer 
another example of the exploitation of past memories of sectarian violence, as they were 
instigated by memories of World War II and Kosovo in times of tension. 91 
 Finally, normative mechanisms of transitional justice have limits when it comes to 
truth seeking in historical cases that are not immediate, and the construction of a shared 
historical narrative. Trials have a focus on judicial truth, or a truth that is homogeneous, 
authoritative, and can be proven in a court beyond a reasonable doubt. While the field has 
put great significance on the victims’ dignity and the recognition of their version of the 
story, the fact that a certain truth cannot always be addressed by a court due to certain 
parameters, such as the absence of criminals, sets ground for impunity and does not help 
ensure the non-occurrence of wrongdoings in the future. Furthermore, transitional justice 
aims at reaching a homogeneous version of the truth than can be recalled in the same way 																																																								
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in different arenas such as the judicial one, the social sphere and the academic realm. In 
cases such as Karbala, which concerns two main religious groups that do not view the 
story or the idea of victimhood in the same fashion, the effort of reaching a consensus on 
one version of the story can be problematic and make the process of reconciliation much 
more difficult. Barkan cites the example of Northern Ireland, which is similar to the 
Karbala situation, where it is clear that each side of the conflict has its own version of the 
truth. Reaching a single understanding of history is not being attempted, and “although 
there is intensive work of reconciliation, conflict resolution, and judicial inquiries, these 
efforts do not extend to bridging the historical narrative, but continue to allow sectarian 
perspectives to dominate the public sphere.” 92  
Historical Cases and Transitional Justice  
 While it should be kept in mind that “transitional justice’s focus on accountability 
means that it privileges addressing recent violence, primarily those violations in which 
the responsible perpetrators are still alive and can be brought to justice” 93, it does not 
mean that the mechanisms of the field cannot be adapted and used to address older, 
impactful, historical conflicts such as the Battle of Karbala. Elazar Barkan’s work has 
primarily focused on historical cases and transitional justice, and how they should be 
approached given the limitations of mechanisms like truth-commissions and tribunals. In 
certain instances, such as Karbala, the main issue lies in the fact that using normative 
transitional mechanisms is not necessarily effective. Courts and international tribunals, 
for example, cannot be summoned given the fact that all perpetrators are dead. Truth 
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commissions by definition may not be the more efficient mechanism either, since direct 
victims, whose testimonies and oral reports matter most, are no longer alive.  
 In these situations, it is possible to fill the gaps of transitional justice mechanisms 
and fulfill the goals of the process through an altered approach, including mainly the 
formation of historical truth commissions that then lead to public policy 
recommendations for reparative and recognition processes. Mô Bleeker introduces 
historical commissions as mechanisms similar to truth commissions that emphasize joint 
dialogue by all parties, and that are designed to meet several imperatives, such as “fact-
finding and explicit recognition of facts by perpetrators and society in general, providing 
satisfaction for the victims, (…) and provid(ing) the opportunity to pass on this ‘jointly 
accepted or acknowledged historical truth’ to future generations, and to identity and 
protect archives concerning respective events.” 94 Historical commissions are temporary 
bodies set up through a government mandate that are a true test for democracy as their 
creation requires political maturity and the willingness to accept an independent 
investigative process and its consequences. The commissions are responsible for the 
analysis and scope of human rights violations perpetrated in a given period of time on a 
certain population. They have the responsibility to identify the facts and consequences, 
analyze the contexts in which these events took place, listen to witnesses and survivors if 
they are present, and protect archives and historical documents that will be useful in 
helping to create a common historical narrative. These commissions are not created to be 
punitive or establish the proof of culpability, which is the duty of courts and tribunals. 
Rather, they are an instrument of transition and recognition and are responsible for 																																																								
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facilitating the role of hard justice by establishing the facts of the case in a rigorous 
manner, rendering homage to the victims’ memories, and elaborating public policy 
recommendations that are useful for reparations to victims and conflict prevention. Louis 
Joinet establishes the function of historical commissions in the following terms: 
 “As their name indicates, these commissions are not so much intended to deliver 
 justice as to establish truth by decoding “why” and “how” such things could have 
 happened. Their goal, as I see it, is first of all to make a people aware of what was 
 all too often a hidden reality they did not want to see (...). These commissions can 
 facilitate the work of justice, but this is not their principal goal. The reports they 
 produce are more for the sake of memory than of justice, in the sense of providing 
 the principle according to which a people’s knowledge of the history of its 
 oppression belongs to its heritage and as such must be preserved by appropriate 
 measures in the name of the duty to remember, which is incumbent on the state. 
 The aim of these measures is to preserve the collective memory, and in particular 
 to guard against the development of revisionist and negationist theories.” 95 
 Public policy recommendations, which may combine retributive and restorative 
elements, are a primordial result of historical commissions as they allow for the 
strengthening of the recognition process for the suffering of the victims and stand as a 
powerful statement that such violence will not occur again. They generally combine a 
series of restorative elements such as public apologies, institutional reforms, and 
education and memorialization practices. The latter include the creation of museums, 
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memorials, ceremonies of remembrance, the erection of monuments in memory of the 
conflict, and the creation of new history books that tell history from a combined 
perspective. Public policy recommendations are referred to as the preventive aspect of the 
process. Indeed, the implementation of reparative elements serves to prevent 
reoccurrences of the conflict, and shows that the memories of the victims are legitimate. 
The fact that they are carried out publically and officially makes a strong statement that 
crimes with impunity can no longer be part of a true democratic society, and that 
memorialization is the work of both the victims and the perpetrators.  
 Historical commissions are not as visible as truth and reconciliation commissions, 
which take place in the aftermath of conflicts that are quite immediate and recent. 
Historical commissions have mainly been used with regards to the events of World War 
II, or to investigate the history of colonialism in cases such as Japan and China. One 
example is Switzerland’s Bergier Commission, which was established in 1996 with the 
mandate to “investigate the volume and fate of assets moved to Switzerland before, 
during and immediately after Second World War from a historical a  legal point of view.” 
96 The assets included gold, foreign currency regulated by the Swiss National Bank, as 
well as cultural assets of both victims of the Nazi regime, and the perpetrators. Along 
with the examination of the relations between Swiss industrial companies and National-
Socialist ones with regards to their participation in forced labor practices, the 
Commission took into account Switzerland’s refugee policy in parallel to its economic 
agreements with the Axis Power and the Allies. Consequently, the final report adopted a 
firmer stance on victims’ rights and centered its issues on the legal ownership of victims 
and their right to get their assets restituted to them. The report showed that through the 																																																								
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workings of the historical commission, the victims not only got compensation but the 
analysis of Switzerland’s historical narrative opened up new debates regarding its 
neutrality in conflicts and relationship with other states. The Bergier Commission 
importantly contributed to the shaping of modern democracy in Switzerland by opening 
up debates regarding the relationship between Swiss economy and foreign policy, and 
contributing to contemporary discussions on national ethos. Another example is the 
Estonian Presidential Commission of 1991, which was mandated to reconstruct the 
narrative of Nazi crimes in Estonia during the occupation. While it was praised for the 
thorough work that it accomplished, it has also been criticized for failing to raise public 
awareness among Estonians who did not have memories of Jewish extermination due to 
the small population of pre-war Estonian-Jews, create joint conclusions and open up 
honest dialogue about accountability.97 The Lithuanian Presidential Commission was also 
lauded for its effort toward academic exchange, but was unable to produce a report even 
after ten years of activity, due to the lack of political and social support, which was the 
main reason for its failure. 98 
 Historical commissions have often been successful in bringing a feeling of justice 
to the victims of past atrocities. It is safe to assume that for justice to be done, the 
establishment of facts and truth are primordial. In historical cases especially, justice 
means more than punitive measures and the punishment of perpetrators in court. 
Importantly, historical commissions contribute not only to the creation of a convincing 
narrative, but also to the understanding of the reasons behind a perpetrators’ motives, 																																																								
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which enables victims to add a layer to their identities, that of “identities that can live 
with what happened and will no more by defined only by what happened.” 99 The impetus 
for the creation of historical commissions by governments and their efforts in putting into 
effect public policy recommendations to alleviate the burdens of history have a 
tremendously positive effect on citizens, society, democracy and diversity. 100 Parties that 
have an interest in denying or maintaining their versions of the truth without 
accommodation will not have the same influence, a newfound freedom in dialogue will 
diminish the power of dichotomies such as “us and them”, and allow for competing 
narratives to emerge and give way for individual responsibility rather than collective and 
stereotypical blaming. One example of the positive reception of new historical facts that 
led to a reexamination of a people’s identity and responsibility is that of the Jedwabne 
case, which was analyzed by Alexander Karn 101. In the aftermath of the 1941 Nazi 
occupation of Eastern Poland, the Polish population started targeting Jews and carrying 
out systematic acts of violence against them. In the small town of Jedwabne, the local 
population killed and burned hundreds of their Jewish neighbors. The narrative 
disappeared from Polish collective memory and people did not remember their 
responsibility in the event, until Jan Gross 102 brought it back to the attention of the Poles 
and the international community in 2000, after the Polish Institute of National 
Remembrance was entrusted with an investigation into the atrocity by the Polish 
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Parliament.  In light of this recognition, Poles reexamined their identities and attitudes to 
their own history. Extensive discussion, apologies, commissions, and investigations about 
anti-Semitism in Poland took place. The local population was ready to assume its 
historical responsibilities, which ameliorated their relationship with the Jews, who had 
initially viewed them as antagonists during World War II. The creation of the Jedwabne 
Jewish Memorial in 2001, as part of the memorialization process, could be seen as an 
essential element of reconciliation between Jews and Poles,  and a reminder of history for 
future generations. The emergence of this piece of narrative and its acknowledgment by 
the Polish government enabled the inscription of the event in Polish national memory, 
which helped “set the standard for truthfulness, acceptance of responsibility, and teaching 
history.” 103 As Bleeker sums up, a major positive result of historical commissions is “the 
emergence of a space for foundational and fertile dialogue between different narratives 
and the ‘truth,’ the emergence of a whole range of new vocabulary and attitudes relating 
responsibility to individuals rather than engaging in collective blaming, dialogue rather 
than accusations, and diversity rather than the monopoly of a singular, homogenous 
identity.” 104 
Truth Seeking, Historical Dialogue and Shared Narratives  
  In most cases of transitional justice, memory work and the construction of history 
is carried out through mechanisms such as truth-commissions, and represents a 
fundamental step in achieving consent about perpetrated human rights abuses, 
establishing the facts of the case, and bringing direct solace to the victims by recognizing 
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their suffering and paying homage to their experiences. Furthermore, according to Ariel 
Dulitzky, memory work is an important aspect of peace-building, as “the memory of how 
human rights were violated in the past allows us to identify current problems…conceived 
as such, memory initiatives are an integral part of any strategies to promote and guarantee 
human rights and further democracy.” 105 The oral testimonies of victims, along with 
supporting research from criminal cases, are at the heart of truth-commissions since the 
victims’ dignity is the major focus of the field’s advocates. Chrisje Brants and Katrien 
Klep discuss the effects of truth commissions on “the construction of collective memories 
about past human rights abuses,” 106 and find that while those mechanisms are useful in 
uncovering facts and punishing perpetrators, they also have an effect on the way the past 
is narrated. According to the authors, truth commissions tend to create a homogeneous 
version of the story out of many competing truths, and produce a version of the past that 
becomes an authoritative claim of truth in their verdicts and issued reports. 107  The role 
of victim-witnesses in the participation of truth and reconciliation processes is crucial as 
it is their recollections that create history and shape the identity and collective memory of 
an entire community. Victims, being the central figures in transitional justice, have the 
power to shape narratives that help collect and analyze instances of human rights abuses. 
The drawback, however, is that victims, being survivors, often speak with their pain in 
mind, which may lead to a distortion of factual truth. While this problem can be found in 
tribunals as well, the difference is that a court’s verdict is definite and uncontested. The 
truth achieved in a commission, while being authoritative in its own way, still leaves 																																																								
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room for contestation in other areas of a post-violence society, if not in the course of the 
commission’s work.  
 More pertinent to the Karbala case, however, is truth seeking through historical 
commissions and dialogue, which could be seen as an adaptation of transitional justice 
mechanisms for older conflicts as argued by scholars like Brian Grodsky 108, Mark 
Freeman 109  and Lavinia Stan 110 .The recollection of historical memories that the 
commission allows for helps construct collective identity, along with a shared narrative. 
Barkan argues that historical commissions, as opposed to truth and reconciliation ones, 
allow for the minimization of a one-sided narrative, and the creation of a shared historical 
one in which the input of the perpetrator, or the other side’s version, is central. These 
mechanisms are particularly important in cases of historical conflicts, in which memories 
have primacy over contemporary politics. Historical truth, which is based on inanimate 
and textual evidence rather than oral testimonies, and is more useful for older cases such 
as Karbala, cannot be imposed like judicial truth. It is provisional and can be recreated by 
future historians as new archival evidence is uncovered. Also, it must be persuasive 
enough to be politically accepted, and contribute to conflict resolution and prevention. 
The fact that historians cannot base themselves on experience-based personal memories 
does not mean that the latter are not available to historians or that they are not used in 
truth seeking. On the contrary, social memory scholars such as Aleida Assmaan 111 write 
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that past wrongs, which are communicated within families and through social interaction, 
like the story of Karbala, remain powerful by generating identification in society.  
 Historical dialogue, which leads to historical truth, takes place when two sides 
engage in joint writing of history through mechanisms such as bilateral commissions, or 
when historians and other creators of historical knowledge analyze their own accounts of 
history and contribute to the understanding and reexamination of group identities and 
beliefs. In cases of histories of atrocities, such as Karbala, a reevaluation of history from 
both sides can lead to open dialogue that allows both parties to move forward. Historical 
dialogue is not about covering up revulsive facts in order to avoid backlash, but rather, to 
understand a past event from multiple perspectives and get a clearer perception of the 
violence and its causes. Barkan states that “the interaction between perpetrator and victim 
is a new form of political negotiation that enables the rewriting of memory and historical 
identity in ways that can be shared by both.” 112 The common understanding of a specific 
historical event, which historical commissions seek to bring about, will ideally lead to a 
consensus, but if not, will at least help diminish sentiments of denial and negation of the 
suffering of the victims. It will also bring the victims to acknowledge their own 
responsibility in the conflict, if any, and provide them with an incentive to move forward.  
 Historical dialogue can also contribute to “prevention by engendering better 
relations between groups and demythologizing old hatred,” 113 a claim that would be 
supported by historians like E.H. Carr and Eric Hobsbawm who have worked on the role 
of historians in changing historical narratives, and with them, political realities. Historical 
dialogue should be seen as an empathic, constant effort of revealing the truth through 																																																								
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education and culture, and one that can actually be efficient in burying old myths and 
feelings of animosity that can lead to the repetition of historical violence.  Indeed, one of 
the most crucial advantages of historical dialogue does not lie in the fact that it enables 
scholars to shed light on new narrative complexities or discover more effective methods 
of methodology but rather, in showing empathy and open-mindedness to the other side by 
seriously considering its version of the story and avoiding the generalization of “the 
other” as the enemy through a thorough fact-finding process. Mô Bleeker argues that 
such behavior contributes to a positive change in democracy and diversity, as it lays 
down a new foundation for coexistence and opens up a path for new societal 
relationships. 114  
 In order to guarantee the resolution of conflicts, shared historical narratives, 
which are based on the outcome of historical dialogues, must be written by all sides of 
the conflict by academicians who are committed to using their knowledge to counter 
misconceptions and myths regarding an event of the past. Several textbook commissions 
involving Germany and its neighboring territories, such as the Franco-German Textbook 
Commission on Controversial Issues in European History and the Israeli-Palestinian 
Textbook project, have been created by the Georg Eckert Institute for International 
Textbook Research and are committed to working towards the inclusion of a shared 
history for purposes of conflict prevention through education. Israeli and Palestinian 
scholars have made small efforts to organize informal gatherings for joint historical 
writing, and while these steps are praiseworthy, they have had little political impact. 115 																																																								
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The Workshop of Armenian/Turkish Studies, sponsored by several universities such as 
the University of Michigan and the University of Geneva, organized international 
meetings including in Austria in 2004, and saw the contribution of Turkish and Armenian 
scholars to create a shared discourse regarding the atrocities of the Armenian genocide. 
116  These programs, aiming at improving history education and reducing negative 
stereotypes, often issued recommendations via reports on combatting prejudice and 
intolerance. For instance, Recommendation 15 issued by the Council of Europe was 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers of 2001, and stressed that the falsification and 
instrumentalization of history was against the principles of the Council of Europe as 
defined by its statute. 117 While the policy impacts of such commissions are minimal at 
this stage, the effort must be recognized for its contribution to prevention through history, 
and the building of a more peaceful relationship between identity groups.  
 Given the assumption that parties are ready to confront another facet of their 
beliefs and can be persuaded in contributing to an open dialogue, historical narratives can 
become political tools that governments and the public may use to investigate the root of 
local animosities and get a new understanding of past conflicts. The role of history in 
shaping conflicts is not negligible, as violent outbreaks are often alimented by 
misunderstandings that instigate conflict renewal, based on stereotypes and myths that 
have never been addressed, and might lead to reticence from foreign states regarding 
intervention.  One striking example is that of the Bosnian intervention led by the United 
States, which was delayed for three years “because the United States viewed the war as 																																																								
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part of the Balkans’ culture - a force of nature.” 118 The step towards the construction of 
shared historical narratives, despite the reality that all communities strongly hold on to 
their beliefs and versions of history, must be taken to allow for a better understanding of 
conflicts and a difference in public discourse and perception their own history. 119  By 
encouraging the end of historical myths and animosities, historical commissions show a 
strong potential for peace building and successful reconciliation processes. 
 
Analyzing Karbala in the Framework of Transitional Justice  
 
 
“Can deep-seated antagonisms, rooted in the memories of past violence and suffering, be 
overcome by the means of critical historical scholarship?” 120 In order to provide a 
tentative answer to this question, Karbala will be analyzed as a case study in the 
theoretical framework of transitional justice that was described above. Of all the 
mechanisms that are comprised in the process of reconciliation that transitional justice 
aims for, historical commissions, used to deal with controversial but remote historical 
events, and memorialization mechanisms, textbooks and museums in particular, will be 
used to assess the Battle of Karbala. It must be noted, however, that the tensed 
geopolitical situation in Iraq and the Islamic State’s presence in the country, which has 
been previously discussed, does not create an ideal setting for the establishment of 
transitional justice procedures. The following suggestions are to be considered during a 
post-violence climate, in which the rule of law and social institutions, such as mandated  																																																								
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commissions, scholarly workshops and academic environments, might have the potential 
to flourish. Most importantly, the Iraqi government, which would be the mandating party 
of the historical commission on Karbala, must understand the importance of conducting 
the process and acknowledge that the latter could shed light on the roots of recent violent 
outbreaks, and thus, serve national interests. As Pettai explains, “addressing disputes over 
a common history has thus become a vital interest for many states (…) in order to 
stabilize intergroup relations within society.” 121 It is only through this recognition that 
the set up of a historical commission, which will require consistent funding, and the 
application of its resulting recommendations will have a chance to work concretely.   
 
The Work of the Historical Truth Commission  
 
 Inspiring social integration and understanding is crucial in a society in which 
identity groups coexist after a history of violence, misunderstanding and sectarian 
discrimination. In order to avoid that these lines of conflicts, alimented by remaining 
feelings of animosity, reemerge and initiate division once again, a process of truth 
seeking and reconciliation should be put in place in Iraq. For an event that goes back a 
long time, such as Karbala, historical commissions are a fist step in encouraging truth-
seeking, fact-finding and dialogue between different parties, understanding the point of 
view of each side, reaching a relatively agreed-upon historical narrative, and creating 
public policy recommendations that will bring satisfaction to the victims through the 
official recognition of the human rights perpetrated against them. As previously 
discussed, the memory of Karbala is used by both sides of the conflict in different ways: 
while the Shias commemorate the tragedy and use it as a tool of empowerment against 																																																								
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the violence that they still face in Iraq today, Sunnis and extreme anti-Shia groups either 
dismiss the event as unimportant or manipulate it to threaten Shias and encourage 
sectarian tensions. Dealing with Karbala through legal and formal procedures might be an 
efficient way to stimulate a viable peace-building process and improve relations between 
religious sects.  
 When setting up a historical commission, the Iraqi government might have to 
respect several principles that seem vital to the credibility of the former. First of all, the 
commission must be independent and autonomous, and should not be influenced by Shia 
or Sunni pressure groups that wish to secure their respective interests. Secondly, the 
commission will be able to perform its task better if it is composed of recognized experts 
and scholars who work professionally, and have a high sense of integrity that forces them 
to stay neutral. The government should make the mandate concise and achievable within 
a reasonable time, and give the commission the ability to make policy recommendations 
that the authorities should consider binding in order to uphold the efficiency of the 
process. In order to facilitate the work of the commission, the government must give it 
access to archives and information that are necessary for experts to analyze acts of 
wrongdoings and recreate an objective narrative, as they cannot turn to direct 
perpetrators, victims or witnesses who are long dead or incapable of providing testimony. 
The commission, with guaranteed physical protection for its members, must also be able 
to meet any person or visit any place it deems necessary to help with the truth-seeking 
and reconciliation process. The expert historians of Sunni and Shia Islamic history who 
would make up the body of the committee will thus endorse a political role in trying to 
resolve a conflict between two narratives, which will have positively intended 
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consequences on political phenomena in Iraq, as it will provide clarification regarding the 
sources of sectarian violence that the country regularly faces. 122 In fact, the interaction 
between historical scholarship and politics that will take place within the historical 
commission can possibly result in a “truly reconciliatory historical narrative able to 
indeed impact the political conflict at hand (…) and offer a new reading of the historical 
past that is compelling yet open enough to encourage critical revision of longstanding 
myths and further dialogue.” 123 While the other outcome of this interaction is the 
emergence of a biased or inconclusive narrative, either because the fact-finding process 
might not be fruitful or the constructed narrative is simplistic and discredits alternative 
views or identity-making memories, historical commissions remain one of the most 
efficient “sub-mechanisms” of transitional justice for remote cases that has been created 
so far.     
 In order to recreate a complete narrative of the facts and atrocities perpetrated at 
Karbala, historians will need to assess and consult both Shia and Sunni versions. The 
cultural memory of Karbala being most important in Shia tradition, it is not surprising to 
find that the event is very frequently, if not always, told from a Shia perspective and not a 
Sunni one. Archive work and collaboration with Sunni religious figures might help 
bridge the gap and enable a dialogue between the versions, and an understanding of each 
side’s view regarding the conflict. Applying modern human rights principles to an 
ancient conflict might be a way to add perspective to the event of Karbala. It would not 
only be useful in order to understand the importance and emotional value it holds for the 
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Shias until today, but also allow for possible agreements on human rights violations by 
both Shia and Sunni sides with regards to commonly believed facts about the battle. 
Jeffrey K. Olick and Brenda Coughlin favorably argue that the universality of human 
rights has two meanings. First, that human rights principles can be applied to all 
communities, and second, that they are valid principles that can be used to analyze 
historical conflicts and past societies as well. 124  It can be deduced from Shia 
recollections, which are readily available, that the human rights violations perpetrated 
against Hussain and his family violate fundamental principles of international human 
rights law, as well as principles of the Geneva Conventions regarding the law of war and 
conflicts and the treatment of non-combatants. However, it must be emphasized once 
again that the information is based on ancient historical records that cannot be easily 
verified, and that will be subject to dispute, since the Sunnis have reservations regarding 
the history of Karbala.    
 In general terms, the atrocities violate Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which respectively stipulate that all human beings are free 
and equal in dignity, and should not be subjected to slavery or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment and punishment. 125 The conflict could also be analyzed through the 
Geneva Conventions, which refer to a body of treaties enunciating the laws regarding the 
treatment of civilians, prisoners of wars and soldiers during times of conflict. Common 
Article 3 126, which covers internal armed conflicts, requires that all persons in enemy 
hands should be given humane treatment, and specifically prohibits murder, mutilation, 																																																								
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torture, cruel, humiliating and degrading treatment, and the taking of hostages. The fact 
that the bodies of Hussain and his men were decapitated and mutilated, and their heads 
mounted on lances in the aftermath of the war clearly violates those provisions. Atrocities 
perpetrated on Hussain’s women and children should be considered under the fourth 
Geneva Convention, which guarantees the protection of civilians, or persons taking no 
active part in the hostilities. Again, Article 3 warns against violence to life and persons, 
and prohibits torture and inhumane treatment. Women and children in Karbala were 
deprived of water, looted, made captives, stripped of their hijabs and humiliated in the 
streets of Kufa and Damascus, which falls under and violates Common Article 3(d) 
regarding outrages upon personal dignity, including humiliating treatment. These actions 
also violate Article 33 prohibiting pillage, and Article 27 of the Convention, which 
stipulates that protected persons “are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their 
persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and 
their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be 
protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and 
public curiosity.” 127 Women, especially, must be protected against any form of attack on 
their honor and any form of indecent assault, which the Umayyad army did not respect at 
all. 
 The recognition of these atrocities through the lenses of memory and international 
law, along with a recollection of the facts from a Sunni perspective especially regarding 
main diverging points such as Yazid’s involvement in the conflict or the establishment of 
an actual rebellion from Hussain, will enable the truth commission to create a shared 
narrative that could potentially initiate common understanding, a reevaluation of 																																																								
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collective memory, and encourage more peaceful relations between Shias and Sunnis in 
Iraq. This process, of course, is difficult to achieve. In this particular case, the main 
difficulty resides in the fact that each side is firmly convinced of its own version, and has 
lived according to it for centuries. Given this fact, the acceptance of newfound 
responsibility of either side in the conflict might be disputed, especially by the population 
at large. For instance, if further evidence from the Sunni perspective demonstrates that 
Yazid did in fact order the slaughter of Hussein, there might be a risk of contestation by 
Sunni religious leaders who have power over the masses and can influence the latter’s 
belief in the historical commission. However, the possible reduction of historical 
animosity that the commission aims for will be an important factor in fostering 
reconciliation between both identity groups, if the narrative is constructed without bias 
and takes into account each side’s position while still aiming to unveil the factual truth. 
The historical commission will also prepare a report in vernacular Arabic that will not 
only detail the facts of the case, but also show a synthesized narrative that will be more 
comprehensive and thus, easily understood by the public. In order to maximize the 
report’s potential for reconciliation, the commission should consider including a history 
of the Shia commemoration of Karbala and an explanation of the meaning behind the 
sect’s sorrow and mourning practices. By adding this part to the report, the commission 
will ensure that Sunnis get a more truthful understanding of Shias beliefs and ethos, since 
the misunderstanding about Shias practices encourages Sunnis to view them as heretics, 
and makes sectarian rhetoric by the Islamic State more believable. The government, in a 
mature effort to make the work of the truth commission worthwhile, must make the 
report easily available to both Shias and Sunnis, and encourage its dissemination in 
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independent newspapers such as Al-Mada, or on radio stations like AFN Iraq and Karbala 
FM, which broadcast news within Baghdad and Karbala respectively. Also, the 
government should encourage debates around the findings of the report through the 
medium of citizen journalism, which includes blogging, in order to get a sense of the 
opinions and reception of Iraqis citizens, and the youth in particular, as they will be the 
actors of tomorrow’s society. Of course, there is no certain way of ensuring that the 
report will be well received by all. However, the notion of unity in the Islamic nation 
(Ummah) is central in both Shia and Sunni belief, and is inscribed in the Qur’an. 128 If 
Shia and Sunni prominent moderate religious leaders succeed in sensitizing their 
audiences about the report through sermons or speeches during Friday prayers, and 
reminding them of the importance of brotherhood and Islamic unity that the religion 
preaches, there is a better chance that the constructed narrative will be accepted, or at 
least, considered in a more tolerant manner by both sides. This realization, along with the 
work of the historical commission, might then lead to the creation of public policy 
recommendations considered binding on the government that will help alleviate the 
trauma of the victimized population, and bring closure and reconciliation for the case 
through formally recognized memorialization practices.  
Public Policy Recommendations for Recognition  
 
 Compensating victims of past wrongs is a core component of transitional justice. 
Financial reparations are the most direct form of compensation but the latter may not be 
very efficient for remote historical cases in which victims are long dead, and their lineage 
may not be easily determined. In those situations, memorialization initiatives should be 
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taken in order to ensure official acknowledgment of the direct victims’ suffering and 
lasting remembrance in both the victims’ and the perpetrators’ minds. Julia Viebach, in 
her study of memorials in Rwanda, finds that memorials prevent forgetting and are 
therefore an example of symbolic punishment for the perpetrators, who cannot deny their 
wrongdoings in the face of an official site of remembrance. 129 Rwanda is governed by 
the Tutsis, who were the victims of the genocide, which means that building memorials in 
remembrance of their own victimhood was less difficult to achieve. It is not often in 
history that perpetrators build memorials, which remain a permanent statement of their 
own deeds. For instance, it is sixty years after the Holocaust that Germany, as the 
perpetrator state, decided to build the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin in 2005 as a 
commemorative gesture for the Jews who had been exterminated by the Nazi regime 
during World War II. The memorial, however, was subject to criticism from the Jewish 
community, which found that it was too concentrated on the victims but did not show 
anything about the perpetrators’ actions. 130 The fact that the memorial was not widely 
accepted by the victimized community undermined its credibility. Memorialization by the 
perpetrators, while being quite rare due to the reticence that the latter would have about 
publicly acknowledging their own violations, could be extremely powerful if the 
memorials incorporated the complete version of the atrocities, including the presence and 
actions of the perpetrators.     
 Susanne Buckley Zistel and Stefanie Schäfer describe potential functions of 
memorialization as “vindicating the dignity of victims, stimulating open debates amongst 																																																								
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at the University of Oxford.  
130 Cohen-Pfister, Lauren, and Dagmar Wienroeder-Skinner. Victims and Perpetrators: 1933-1945: (Re)Presenting the 
Past in Post-Unification Culture. De Gruyter, 2006: 209-210  
	 66	
past injustices, contributing to conflict transformation, strengthening resistance against 
the dominating narrative, aiding in building a new and cohesive nation on the ruins of the 
past, and providing a place for private reflection and mourning.” 131 Memorialization can 
be done creatively, depending on each group’s way of remembering and contributing to 
the effort.  The new trend of memory collection in Holocaust education 132, for instance, 
in which student groups collect six million of a chosen object to symbolize the victims of 
Hitler’s genocidal policies, has been criticized for trivializing the Holocaust but 
nevertheless show that contributions to memorization can be offered in non-conventional 
ways as well. The Sunnis in Iraq, given that dissemination methods and religious rhetoric 
would have been efficient in encouraging them to view the Karbala narrative through a 
lens of tolerance, could also their effort towards acceptance by adopting a similar trend or 
contributing to memorialization in their own way. It has been established previously that 
the Sunnis agree that Hussain was a righteous man, and are not particularly attached to 
Yazid, even though they do not necessarily believe in his involvement in the massacre, 
which makes the acceptance of the narrative more possible. The Sunnis could, for 
example, offer baskets containing water and Karbala symbols such as the Islamic flag or 
hand pendants that represent the martyrdom of Hussain’s brother ‘Abbas, to their Shia 
neighbors in order to show that they respect the latter’s beliefs and wish to take part in 
the commemoration process. Association Modeste et Innocent in Rwanda, which works 
around the theme of forgiveness, has been able to put a similar process in place and has 
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enabled Tutsi victims to grant pardon at different degrees to Hutu perpetrators. 133     
 Martha Minow argues in her study that victims of violence who are unsatisfied 
with a courtroom’s decision demand vengeance 134, which can be a dangerous feeling as 
it continues to put the victims in the power of the perpetrator, and does not allow them to 
move forward. Forgiveness, on the other hand, allows the reconciliation process to go 
more smoothly and breaks the vicious cycle of revenge and animosity. Society’s 
responses to perpetrators, which, for instance, come in the form of amnesties, are 
unacceptable to victims of gross human rights violations who view them as unequal and 
unfair in contrast to the suffering they endured at the hands of the perpetrators, and the 
memories that they have to live with. Sarah Jones 135 suggests that memorialization, 
through education and culture, could be a response that lies between both extremes. 
Memorialization is a satisfactory mechanism for victims given its official and public 
character. It does not oblige the victims to forgive but assures that nobody forgets what 
they have been through. In the case of Karbala, it has already been established that 
forgiveness will be too much to ask for, given the sacred character of Imam Hussain and 
people’s belief in the miracles that the tragedy of Karbala can bring them in this life and 
the afterlife. Remembrance through memorialization mechanisms such as history 
textbooks and memorial museums, however, will enable them to get recognition without 
being forced to forgive the perpetrators. The official acknowledgment of their suffering, 
specifically in places of conflict like Iraq, gives the Shias a sense of security and assures 
them that the actions of the perpetrators are officially recognized. Memorialization can be 																																																								
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seen as a promise that the world will not permit violations to occur against the same 
population again.  
 History textbooks, according to Simone Lässig, are seen as a key source for 
shaping collective memories and forming social cohesion.136  Including a complete 
version of the story of Karbala, one that would have been shaped by a historical truth 
commission, in school curriculum will educate the future generations of Iraqi Shia and 
Sunni about the past of their religious guides and the beliefs of their ancestors, and will 
allow the narrative to highlight the victims’ suffering, stay engraved in the collective 
memory of groups and nation, and ensure that a generation that knows its history will not 
repeat it. Of course, conveyors of historical knowledge, such as teachers, play a 
primordial role in the assessment of the materials and the vision of the “other” that they 
convey to the classroom, which can either lead to soothing or exacerbation. History 
textbook projects are mature political and peace education projects that are part of 
reconciliation, in the sense that they are an emanation of a society’s willingness to coexist 
in a more peaceful environment, recreate empathy among ethnic and religious groups, 
and move beyond the stereotypical dichotomy of victim-perpetrator that is used to 
describe a violent past. In the case of Iraq, this process can be successfully implemented 
in post-conflict academic institutions that would be safe and welcoming of students from 
multiethnic groups. The government should push for the inclusion of the shared narrative 
in the historical curriculum of all schools in the region, and put in place workshops and 
seminars for instructors during which the historians who participated in the commission 
can clarify the facts of the story, address issues and concerns, and work with teachers to 																																																								
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find ways to answer the most probable questions that students from Shia and Sunni 
backgrounds might have regarding the narrative. While controversial issues remain 
sensitive and there is always a fear that teaching a joint history will open old wounds and 
bring back painful memories, history textbooks can become a medium of trust and 
empowerment. Learning about a history in which blame is not necessarily one-sided and 
one in which each party recognizes their responsibility permits a stronger bond to form 
between identity groups. This bond of unity encourages mutual understanding and effort 
to go strengthen and build peace, which is a constant effort in a society that has become 
fragile after a history of sectarian conflicts. The methodology and theory regarding the 
impact of history books on societal change is too little in scholarship at the moment, but 
we can deduce from previous examples of textbook commissions that these project have 
potential and are getting recognition. New projects aimed at teaching a history of many 
perspectives, such as the German-Czech project group or a discussed, yet unlikely in the 
current political climate, Egyptian textbook project written by leaders of different 
religious groups for a multireligious classroom, are hopeful examples that a joint history 
of Shia-Sunni relations, in which Karbala will have particular importance, could be 
considered when, and if, Iraq is given the opportunity to move towards a post-violence 
society.   
 Karbala and Najaf, two of the most important cities for the Shia population, are 
home to the shrines of Hussain, ‘Abbas and all the other soldiers of Karbala. The shrine 
of ‘Ali is located in Najaf, and visited everyday by Shia believers who come to pray and 
ask for ‘Ali’s intercession before God on their behalf. Unsurprisingly, those places of 
remembrance and memory are often targets of the Islamic State and have been destroyed 
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many times in conflict periods, because they do not hold official significance and have 
never been mentioned as memorials or proofs of Shia oppression during Karbala. The 
Shia population in Iraq makes its strongest efforts as the victim group to ensure that the 
memory of Karbala lives on, and has tried to build memorials with the knowledge and 
liberty that they can have in the midst of Islamic State occupation, in order to show that 
they will not forget their victimhood. During the period of ‘Ashura for instance, Shias 
reconstructed small scenes of the battle of Karbala along the road, showing the most 
powerful and emotional moments of the battle such as the farewell of Hussain to Zainab 
and the murder of Hussain’s young child. Mahdi Modarresi, a prominent scholar of Shia 
Islam, has expressed the need and importance to have a Karbala museum 137 in order to 
continue the processes of historical and cultural education. The creation of memorial sites 
and museums also makes a powerful statement for the empowerment of victim groups 
and previously marginalized communities, such as the Shia.   
 Memorials and museums are auratic places, or places that are directly connected 
to memories of repression, and their power resides in their permanence. Their general 
significance for the victims of human rights abuses is demonstrated by Sarah Jones in her 
analysis of the Berlin Stasi prison memorial, Gedenkstaätte Berlin-Hohenschönhausen, in 
which she shows “the importance of memorialization for victims of human rights abuses 
in terms of a personal and collective coming to terms with the past.” 138  Truth 
commissions being the first step in acknowledging the abuses that occurred in the 
victims’ past, it is only after the dissemination of victim memories to society at large and 																																																								137	On his Twitter account, Sayed Mahdi Modarresi (@SayedModarresi) posted pictures of representations of the 
Karbala saga along the road in Iraq, with the following caption: “simple, for useful representations of scenes from the 
saga of #ImamHussain. Yet another reason why we need a permanent Ashura exhibit.” This tweet is from November 
12, 2016.			
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the official acknowledgment of the perpetrators’ wrongdoings that survivors feel a sense 
of inner healing. The materiality of the memorial, one that would not disappear or 
disintegrate, and its visual and tangible aspects are essential in the process of 
reconstructing memories of past experiences, and concretely coming to terms with what 
really happened. In the case of the prison memorial, one survivor relates that after coming 
back to the site of incarceration, he was able to confront the past and remember that his 
cell was made out of rubber. Another one felt empowered, as one of the functions of 
memorials is to give victims their dignity back, and give them moral power over their 
oppressors. The memorial did not just have an impact at the individual level, but also at 
the community one. It enabled the creation of communities of individuals who had shared 
similar experiences, and brought them together at a space that was especially offered for 
the creation of memorials for a specific community. The creation of memorials can 
contribute to the transitional justice process “in a context where (amnesty) is unthinkable 
and (punitive justice) unsatisfactory or incomplete.” 139  In the case of Karbala, 
forgiveness may not be attainable mainly due to religious and imbedded attachments for 
Hussain, and punitive justice cannot be achieved simply due to the fact that the 
perpetrators are long dead. The creation of a memorial, a museum for instance, answers 
the call for justice that the community makes in its eulogies, salutations and 
commemorative processes.  
 To guarantee its official character, the creation of the main memorial museum in 
Karbala should be ordered by the government. If Iraq is still governed by the Shia 
majority, the process will be facilitated. However, if the party in power is Sunni, it must 
allow the building of a museum that recognizes the victimization of Shias, but also ensure 																																																								
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the credibility of the monument by showing the responsibility of the perpetrators in a 
visible manner within its walls. The museum should display historical artifacts, letters, 
paintings and representations of the Karbala events, and explanatory video footages by 
experts and historians. It could also have exhibitions on the plight of Hussain’s women 
and children, who were central actors of the conflict, and present the narrative of Karbala 
through a gender-based perspective, inspired from the facts that will be recollected from 
history. Along with the museum, the creation of an information center would be an 
effective way for visitors to get more explanation about Karbala through real-time 
conversations with Islamic history experts, or discussions with Shia volunteers about 
their beliefs and contemporary experiences through the memory of conflict. The creation 
of this memorial will symbolize formal recognition of the human rights abuses of 
Karbala, and give Shias a certain symbolic power over the groups that try to bury the 
memories of event. Most importantly, it will uphold the legacy of the conflict, and 
strengthen the collective memory of the group. In the midst of all the commemorative 
processes that the Shias carry out each year, a museum will be a microcosm of the 
process of remembering and stand as a physical place that will make a statement about 
the importance of memory, and will keep within its walls, the narrative of the past that 
the Shias never want to forget.  
 Recognition of an ancestral conflict through the means of historical commissions 
and memorialization has the potential to prevent future conflicts, particularly those that 
stem from past hatred and animosity. When the principal historical conflict is addressed, 
governments are able to prevent future outbreaks from occurring by understanding the 
roots of national divisions, and taking the necessary measures to prevent the reoccurrence 
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of a violent episode. Society also has a role in prevention. By accepting that past human 
rights abuses have occurred and after being confronted with actual memorials and 
physical structures of remembrance, a society’s collective memory undergoes a  
transformation and incorporates the memories of past abuses, minimizing the latter’s 
chances of reoccurrence and accomplishing the fourth goal of transitional justice, which 
is “a durable peace with assurance that a return to violence is unlikely.” 140  
 The past should not become an escape route from the present. The culture of 
remembrance, which includes the creation of memorials, films and exhibitions about the 
past, should empower and encourage states to address similar issues in present time rather 
than keeping the latter in an unproductive and inactive commemoration of history. 
Durable peace can be enforced in Iraq by honoring the victims of the past by thinking 
about the ways in which human rights can be applied in contemporary times. The 
establishment of a Karbala Commemoration Day, or any other day of common 
remembrance, would be a way to assemble Iraqi citizens from Sunni and Shia beliefs for 
a yearly recognition of past atrocities. It could feature round tables and think tanks during 
which citizens and experts would engage in debates and intellectual discussions regarding 
the preservation of human rights in Iraq, especially in the aftermath of Islamic State 
occupation and its policies, which include the enslavement of women and girls and the 
indiscriminate targeting of civilians, among other violations.   
 The case of former Yugoslavia demonstrates that institutional capacity building is 
a crucial aspect of sustainable peace, along with formal recognition mechanisms. A 
reform or rebuilding of the justice system, for instance, is a long-term and arduous task 																																																								
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but a necessary one in ensuring that the rule of law is respected and future conflicts have 
a lesser chance of taking place. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia 
have received assistance from the European Union and other international organizations 
to improve the rule of law, and have allocated high proportions of their budgets to the 
improvement of their judicial systems. The regions, along with Serbia, have also 
recognized that the non-application of domestic judicial decisions was a systematic 
problem and threatened the goal of long-term justice. Finally, the creation of independent 
human rights institutions is essential in ensuring a viable respect for human rights and 
social cohesion, through peace-building societal programs and informal forums for 
discussion. In former Yugoslavia, all states that faced conflict established various human 
rights institutions, but faced major obstacles that impacted those institutions’ efficiency. 
In some cases, a reduction in the budget directly reduced the effectiveness of the 
organizations, and the non-implementation of the decisions issued by the human rights 
institutions discredited the latter’s credibility. Strong support from the government is 
necessary to uphold the credibility of these mechanisms, and shows that national 
leaderships are ready to keep their promise to protect the rule of law and human rights in 
a state that has already lived through turmoil. In Iraq, the implementation of 
organizations that would learn from the Karbala narrative and follow up on the work of 
the historical commission, and the reinforcement of the judicial system after the 
transitional process regarding Karbala terminates would be appropriate ways to 
consolidate the guarantee of non-occurrence in the country, but the task at hand is 
enormous. The first step would be to redevelop an Iraqi-owned independent court system 
that would be accepted and trusted by the population. This task is particularly difficult in 
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Iraq, given its history under Saddam Hussein and more recently, the Islamic State. The 
previous regimes’ policies have unsurprisingly caused a distrust in judicial institutions 
from Iraqis, an increase in corruption, inefficiency and intimidation in courts, and a lack 
of concern for human rights. The Higher Judicial Council of Iraq and the Iraqi Supreme 
Court are the two main judicial institutions that form the backbone of the legal system in 
Iraq. In order to ensure their efficiency, mechanisms must be put in place for prospective 
lawyers and judges, who should be trained according to Iraqi legal principles and general 
rules of impartiality. Biases in court decisions, based on religious animosity or difference 
in religious sects, must be slowly eradicated through the development of the rule of law. 
Participants in the judicial realm, including police officers or prison guards, must be 
sensitized and taught to report human rights abuses or instances of corruption by fellow 
colleagues. While this proposed plan cannot and will certainly not be successful in a short 
period of time, these basic first steps in the creation of a democratic judicial system seem 
to be primordial in a country where the rule of law has long been absent. It is only 
through the implementation of a trusted legal system in Iraq that the cessation of violence 




 When historical conflicts are left unaddressed, future reoccurrences and the 
exaggeration of contemporary conflicts over old wounds and history animosity are more 
likely. Through the example of the Battle of Karbala, a central event in Shia Islamic 
history and identity, this thesis has tried to demonstrate that history is often at the heart of 
current national struggles, and one of the ways to reduce the impact of the past on 
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contemporary outbreaks is to address and recognize the original historical conflict 
through the mechanisms of transitional justice.  
 From Saddam Hussain’s regime to the Islamic State today, Shia oppression has 
been encouraged by sectarian rhetoric and the instrumentalization of historical events, 
particularly the Battle of Karbala. The Islamic State has been quite vocal on Twitter 
regarding Ashura, and its supporters have threatened to attack the Shia holy cities of 
Najaf and Karbala, where ‘Ali and Hussain’s shrines are located respectively. In 2014, 
one supporter of the terror group tweeted, “Shiites, prepare yourselves for our bombs. 
Ashura is here and Karbala is not far anymore. Be patient devil Shiites.” 141  The 
spokesman of the Islamic State has also vowed to wage war against Shia strongholds, 
warning in an audio recording from June 2014, “continue your march as the battle is not 
yet raging, it will rage in Baghdad and Karbala. So be ready for it.” 142 Through its 
rhetoric and actions, the Islamic State proves that Karbala, which has never been formally 
recognized, is used as a tool of oppression against the Shias and enables the anti-Shia 
group to continue its persecution against the religious sect with impunity.  
 The mechanisms of transitional justice, which can be adapted to address remote 
historical conflicts such as Karbala, are efficient in providing recognition for past human 
rights atrocities and the victims’ suffering, and thus, minimizing the reoccurrence or 
manipulation of historical events in contemporary times. Through the processes of 
historical truth commission and memorialization especially, Karbala can be formally 
addressed and Shias’ call for recognition, possibly answered. Transitional justice has the 
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potential to provide a conclusion for the historical transgressions in Karbala through the 
establishment of a common understanding of the conflict between Shia and Sunnis, a 
basis for future relationships between identity groups, an opportunity for historical 
dialogue, and the creation of a common narrative. Together, these elements make durable 
peace and security more attainable, along with the creation of a judicial system that gives 
primacy to impartiality and the rule of law.   
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